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ABSTRACT 
(RE)DEFINING <MARRIAGE>: AN AUTOHISTORIA OF AN IDEOGRAPH
by Robert M. Gutierrez 
 This study explores <marriage> as an ideograph in the law and everyday life 
through an analysis of private and public texts and embodied acts.  The purpose of this 
study was to engage <marriage> intersectionally as a power structure with wide-ranging 
influence over society to locate resistance.  Utilizing rhetorical methods, this work 
examined archives and repertoires through an autohistoria of a queer Chicano male 
<married> before the passage of Proposition 8, the California Constitutional Amendment 
that banned <marriage> for LGBTQ couples.  By exploring <marriage> through 
metaphors and performative writing, this study constructs <marriage> in the tradition of 
the shaman to present new possibilities for <marriage> and queer theory.
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Chapter One: Introduction
<Marriage> as an Ideograph
Marriage functions as an ideograph as evidenced by the structure, abstraction, and 
ability to both unite and divide. – H. Stassen & B. Bates
In a study of popular beliefs about <marriage>, Stassen and Bates determined that 
“respondents were able to provide a concrete definition of the term,” but that 
“<marriage> remained “an abstract notion” that “varied according to ideology” and “has 
the ability to change over time” (Stassen & Bates, 2010, p. 4).  They cite these responses 
as evidence that <marriage> is an ideograph.  Michael Calvin McGee (1980) pioneered 
the study of ideographs as a critical rhetorical analytic.  In his landmark essay, he writes: 
“I will suggest that ideology in practice is a political language, preserved in rhetorical 
documents, with the capacity to dictate decision and control public belief and 
behavior” (p. 4-5).  In other words, <marriage> as an ideograph is a structure of power 
with a political capacity to dictate decisions and control public belief and behavior with 
manifestations in text.  As is standard practice in all ideographic analysis, I partition the 
ideograph under critique (marriage) with the symbols “<“ and “>” as a quick-reference to 
both the word and to mark its function in my project as an ideograph.  Analyzing 
ideographs offers a method that “describe[s] the trick-of-the-mind which deludes us into 
believing that we ‘think’ with/through/for a ‘society’ to which we ‘belong,’” (McGee, 
1980, p. 4) and “reveals interpenetrating systems or ‘structures’ of public 
motives” (McGee, 1980, p. 5).
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In this thesis, I argue that analysis of <marriage> is made difficult by the fact that 
it manifests in both legal documents, such as <marriage> licenses, and also embodied 
practices, such as weddings or Gaylas.  For this reason, I make use in this project of both 
rhetorical and autoethnographic methods to analyze <marriage> in both the textual realm 
and in the material lived realm by tracking how we negotiate it in both the law and in 
everyday life.  The law impacts the everyday, and yet, the everyday interprets the law; 
therefore, <marriage> is not a top-down model of power but is hegemonic.  By 
hegemony, I mean that power is not “monolithic or univocal,” but rather, it is an 
“unstable product of a continuous process of struggle” or a “‘war of position’” that exists 
within socially-constructed framings (re)produced through a complex history of political 
and material “common sense[-making]” (Gramsci in Rupert, p. 487-491).  For example, 
the judicial branch of the U.S. government has throughout history affected the everyday 
lives of people through court rulings; however, Rona Halualani, S. Lily Mendoza, and 
Jolanta Drzewiecka (2009) complicate this top-down model by suggesting that culture 
and identity negotiation play a role in determining the ways in which communication 
interculturally manifests in the everyday.  “Judicial opinions, therefore, are not simply 
decisions; they are interpretations, interpretations that lead to other interpretations and so 
forth” (Grindstaff, 2005, p. 164), and it is our everyday experiences in negotiation with 
our various cultures and identities that make these interpretations.  In other words, 
<marriage> is capable of oppression and holds the potential for resistance not only in the 
law but also in the everyday.   
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Keeping this in mind, this thesis aims to decenter the argument against same-sex 
<marriage> made by Michael Warner (1999b) in The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, 
and the Ethics of Queer Life.  I offer a critique that agrees with Warner in that “marriage, 
in short, discriminates” because “marriage sanctifies some couples at the expense of 
others” (p. 82).  At the same time, I disagree with Warner that <marriage> is, by 
definition, heteronormative.  Warner constructs a “politics of shame” to discourage 
pursuit of <marriage> rights by LGBTQ communities.  He argues that through a 
heteronormative process of sexual shaming, <marriage> normalizes some relationships at 
the expense of others, and gay <marriage> promises to replicate this same norm from one 
queer generation to the next.  My thesis extends Warner in an age when some LGBTQ 
couples have state-sanctioned <marriages> (including myself).  When I say I will 
decenter his argument, I mean that I will arrive at his same conclusion about the 
discriminatory nature of <marriage> but will do so from a queer, Chicano perspective.  I 
agree with him that <marriage> is an oppressive institution, but I disagree on the reasons 
why. 
 By tracking both historical patterns and singular experiences of <marriage> in 
both the law and everyday life, this thesis invents a lens to understand the ways in which 
<marriage> controls, restricts, and yet, is redefined by queer, Chicana/o bodies through 
both textual and embodied practices.  Historical or diachronic patterns trace the variances 
in definitional meanings of an ideograph over time; whereas, a synchronic usage traces 
the variances in definitional meanings of an ideograph in one specific moment in time.  
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As McGee explains, “‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’ patterns of political 
consciousness...have the capacity both to control ‘power’ and to influence (if not 
determine) the shape and texture of each individual’s ‘reality’” (McGee, 1980, p. 5).  In 
other words, the similarities and differences between the changing definitional meanings 
of <marriage> chart the shape and organization of our experiences surrounding this social 
structure.
 By tracking the similarities and differences between historical definitions of 
<marriage> (diachronic) and everyday understandings of <marriage> (synchronic), I 
weave a Chicano queer perspective into the dominant narrative of <marriage>.  The 
purpose of this ideographic analysis is to critique <marriage> in both textual and 
embodied forms in order to show the potential for  resistance within <marriage> where 
Warner sees none.  As an ideograph, <marriage> is capable of opening new ways of 
thinking about and embodying possibilities for living within the institution.  In the 
following section, I decenter Warner’s argument by identifying “Queer Chicano 
Ideographs” that demonstrate resistance and agency within the institution of <marriage>.
<Marriage> as a Queer Chicano Ideograph
  My analysis of <marriage> builds on and extends earlier work on ideographs 
done by Dana Cloud and Fernando Pedro Delgado.  Cloud (1998) analyzed the ideograph 
<family values> and demonstrated how definitional tensions (or resistances) in texts 
create a constellation of terms that served a pro-family agenda.  Cloud (1998) dissected 
usages of the term <family values> during the 1992 U.S. presidential election to show 
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how “constructing the family as the site of all responsibility and change... privatizes 
social responsibility for ending poverty and racism” (p. 387).  Although the Republican 
candidate lost the election, the Republican invocation of <family values> continued to 
have lasting political effect on the Clinton era of politics and beyond (p. 387).  Cloud’s 
work demonstrates the usefulness of analyzing ideographs in socio-political contexts.  
Informed by her work, my critique of <marriage> takes into account two social 
movements: LGBTQ rights and Chicana/o civil rights.
  While my analysis is informed by Cloud, I also draw on the work of Delgado 
(1995) who utilized the ideographic method to observe how <Chicano>, <La Raza>, and 
<Aztlán> “mobilized an identity oriented to challenge a range of social, economic, and 
cultural relationships within the context of a complex social movement” (p. 448).  In 
addition to scholarly analysis of those movements, Delgado identified himself as Chicano 
and consciously participated politically in the Chicano movement.  Delgado (1995), a 
self-identified <Chicano> from San José, CA, situates <Chicano> as a political subject 
and maps out a Chicano political agenda.  This agenda includes: “(1) how to constitute a 
Chicano identity and ideology within the broader Mexican-American cultural context; 
and (2) how to activate that community to political action” (p. 446).  Like Delgado, I, too, 
am Chicano undertaking a rhetorical analysis within the context of <marriage>, and my 
work is laser-focused on activating the Chicano community toward political action.  I do 
not have the privilege of ignoring my brown body or the history of oppression and 
colonization it wears. 
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 For this reason, this thesis is not only a scholarly analysis but also a form of 
political action.  In addition to analyzing <marriage> as an ideograph, I also participate in 
redefining it.  To do so, I draw on the Chicana/o civil rights movement and the rhetoric of 
Chicanas/os as well as LGBTQ politics.  In undertaking a thesis that seeks not only to 
analyze but also to redefine <marriage>, my own body is part of the analysis and one of 
my rhetorical resources.  As a married queer Chicano, I carry with me embodied 
memories and traditions—an archive of meaning-making.  As one of the 18,000 gay 
couples legally married before the passage of Proposition 8, the California constitutional 
amendment that limited <marriage> to heterosexuals, the law has disrupted my life and 
the lives of other queer bodies.  As a Chicano, my history is part of a larger narrative of 
oppression and resistance that occupies both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border. 
 As a queer Chicano, my history is part of LGBTQ Mexican history.  For example, 
the number forty-one signifies male homosexuality in Mexican culture because on 17 
November 1901 Mexico City police raided a private party and arrested the forty-one men 
in attendance, half of them dressed as women.  “‘The ball of the 41,’ as it came to be 
known, quickly became the scandal of the year, inspiring over a month of strident, often 
fanciful newspaper reporting” (Irwin, 2000, p. 353).  The ball of the 41 marks the first 
moment when homosexuality entered modern Mexican public discourse and popular 
imagination.  This event defined assumptions about Latino and Chicano homosexuality 
that persist to this day.  As a married, Chicano queer, I see how debates over <marriage> 
are similar to the sensationalism of the ball of the 41 because Chicano rights are also a 
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matter of LGBTQ politics.  For example, as I wait with the cab driver for my husband, he 
asks if he is my brother, my answer leads to a LGBTQ public policy cab ride that places 
my body under inspection.  To utilize the word “husband” in this historical and political 
moment causes a sensation where ever we go.  Coming out of the closet in new contexts 
now carries different burdens.  In the following sections, I conduct an analysis of 
<marriage>-related texts and embodied acts that include my own body’s simultaneous 
participation in LGBTQ politics and the Chicana/o movement.
<Marriage> as Public and Private Texts and Public and Private Embodied Acts
 Cloud (1998), Delgado (1995), and McGee (1980) have all analyzed ideographs in 
their textual form only.  My thesis analyzes the negotiation of the ideograph <marriage> 
in both texts and embodied acts in both public and private forms.  Legal discourse is the 
main site for the (textual) contest over <marriage>.  However, an analysis of only legal 
discourse limits our understanding of how ideographs are re-negotiated.  “At this point, 
we face the limits of legal critique informed solely by public texts such as judicial 
decisions or legislative debates about statutes” (West, 2008, p. 246).  For this study, I 
analyze public texts such as judicial opinions and executive/legislative attempts to 
redefine <marriage> for LGBTQ couples.  However, if I solely analyzed these texts, then 
I would only be analyzing one dimension of <marriage>.  For that reason, I also analyze 
public embodied acts related to <marriage>, such as my own wedding. 
 My approach is informed by the work of Davin Grindstaff (2003) who draws on 
both queer and rhetorical theories and performance studies in his analysis of the 
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ideographs <homosexual> and <heterosexual>.  It is also informed by Diana Taylor’s 
notions of the archive and repertoire.  Similar to my analysis, Grindstaff (2003) turned to 
performance studies to locate agency within the institution of <marriage> in an effort to 
critique Warner’s (1999a, 1999b) anti-<marriage> stance.  However, because he relies on 
Warner’s construction of a politics of shame (and public discourse on <marriage>), 
Grindstaff fails to locate resistance or agency within the law and everyday practices of 
<marriage>.  In my analysis, I show how private texts and private embodied acts extend 
Grindstaff’s work to locate both moments of resistance and agency within <marriage>.
 To examine how both the law and the everyday contribute to our understanding of 
<marriage>, I draw on Grindstaff’s (2003) use of performative ideographs and combine it 
with the concepts of the archive and the repertoire developed by Diana Taylor (2003).  
The “archive” and the “repertoire” are performance studies terms that allow a rhetorician 
greater access to the body.  By accessing the “archive that houses documents, maps, 
literary texts, letters, archaeological remains, bones, videos, films, compact disks,” the 
repertoire is conceived in hegemonic tension with the archive thus opening up 
opportunity for agency in both text and embodied acts (Taylor, 2008, p. 92).  The 
repertoire “enacts embodied memory: performances, gestures, orality, movement, dance, 
singing--in short, all those acts usually thought of as ephemeral, nonreproducible 
knowledge” (Taylor, 2003, p. 20).  My thesis extends the traditional (text-oriented) 
method of analyzing ideographs to include the repertoire in tracking diachronic and 
synchronic meanings of <marriage>.  This approach allows me to analyze the shifting 
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meanings of <marriage> taking place in the everyday.  My interest in the everyday 
requires that I also analyze private texts such as love notes and private embodied acts 
such as kissing as well as public embodied acts and public legal texts.
 I aim to extend traditional (public text-oriented) ideographic analysis by also 
analyzing <marriage> through autoethnographic methods.  Through accounts of my own 
wedding and <marriage>, I show how the everyday embodied acts of a queer <Chicano> 
complicates popular understandings of <marriage>.  For the purposes of this project, 
embodied acts of <marriage> include the public performances of my wedding and my 
civil <marriage>, the gestures and orality of my <marriage> discourse, each sensuous 
movement, every partner dance, and any other ephemeral moment between lovers.  By 
analyzing performances of a queer Chicano in the everyday life, I can extend the 
ideographic method beyond the textual and into the realm of the body.
 My approach is modeled in part on the work of Isaac West (2008). In his article 
“Debbie Mayne’s Trans/scripts: Performative Repertoires in Law and Everyday Life,” 
West utilized Taylor’s archive metaphor to analyze public and hidden texts to locate 
performative acts of agency.  West (2008) analyzed the legal/ private actions of male-to-
female transexual Debbie Mayne by examining public texts, such as legal documents and 
newspaper articles, and hidden texts, such as private letters written to a confidant.  West’s 
(2008) analysis “help[s] explain how subjects productively negotiate the discursive 
circuitries of their domination to make life more livable” (p. 245).  Reading private texts 
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alongside the public ones often “paint[s] a different picture” that can reveal moments of 
agency within the archive (West, 2008, p. 247). 
 Like West, I analyze private texts such as the pictures, poems, emails, letters, and 
videos surrounding my <marriage> with a gay Mexican male.  These items were 
photographed, written, or taped by me to document/reflect on my own wedding and 
<marriage ceremony>; not to share but to re-member with/for my husband, family, and 
friends.  Utilizing West’s work as an example with public and hidden texts, I want to read 
these private texts alongside public laws on <marriage> to reveal moments of agency and 
oppression within the archive to generate knowledge in the law and everyday life
	
  Using this approach, I also analyze public and private performances of <marriage> 
to offer an intersectional lens to observe agency and oppression.  For example, my 
newlywed year consisted of attending two public rallies at San José City Hall. These 
public performances of newlywed constitute part of the repertoire of <marriage>.  These 
repertoires of <marriage> also occur in private conversations, ephemeral tactile moments, 
and undocumented acts as well.  For instance, the messages my cousins, parents, aunts 
and/or uncles whispered into my ear while dancing during my wedding. To study this 
repertoire, I draw on the performative writing method of autohistoria developed by 
Chicana feminists.
	
  Autohistoria “resists easy classification” because the author (me) is purposely 
attempting to create “interventions into and transformations of traditional western” forms; 
the reader (you) experiences a blending of “cultural and personal biographies with 
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memoir, history, storytelling, myth, and other forms of theorizing” creating an 
“interwoven individual and collective identity” (Keating, 2009, p. 9).  Autobiographical 
writing of this kind has been developed by rhetoricians and critical/cultural 
communication studies as a way to access and analyze private and public embodied 
practices (Collier, Hegde, Lee, Nakayama, & Yep, 2001; Conquergood, 1991; Corey & 
Nakayama, 1997; Dicochea, 2004; Enck-Wanzer, 2006).  For example, Bernadette Marie 
Calafell (2005) utilized the autohistoria method to bring performance studies and rhetoric 
into greater dialogue by recounting a pilgrimage to Mexico alongside historical accounts 
of Malintzin Tenépal (i.e., the indigenous translator and lover of Hernan Cortéz, La 
Chingada, y la madre de las mestizas), an important cultural archetype within Latina/o 
culture and politics.  This thesis mirrors that approach. 
<Marriage> as an Autohistoria of an Ideograph
	
 It is through my analysis of both public and private archives and public and private 
repertoires that I critique Warner.  Contrary to what Warner suggests, <marriage> for 
LGBTQ couples is not a failed public policy.  Whereas Warner (1999b) sees no options 
for resisting the heteronormative power structure from within <marriage> due to a 
politics of shame, I disagree.  As a queer Chicano enjoying the “privileges” of a state-
sanctioned <marriage>, I argue that myself and other LGBTQ married couples from 
across the nation are resisting heteronormativity within our <marriages> because 
<marriage> is an ideograph that is defined not only by the law but also through everyday 
communicative acts. 
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 For example, prior to my <marriage>, my queer Chicano body never entered into a 
legal same-sex “in-law” relationship.  For both myself and mi familia politica, this 
queered relationship is different from any relationship we have ever imagined.  Some 
may question this position because typically “in-law” relationships are new for all 
interlocutors, and this may be true--in private archives and repertoires.  However, in 
public, what do I call mi suegra?  Can I hug my state-sanctioned “dad?”  How do you 
explain the “family” picture with our <marriage> license framed and hung in the 
background?  Depending on the context, the answers to these questions differ and create 
new repertoires and archives for LGBTQ interlocutors.  So, <marriage> for LGBTQ 
couples is successfully resisting assimilation into the system because it is an ideograph, 
not a fixed ideology.
	
 At the same time, I also wish to be critical of the institution of <marriage> and 
LGBTQ public policy choices.  Although I agree with Warner that <marriage> 
discriminates, I disagree with the reasons he gives for why <marriage> should be 
abandoned.  From a queer of color perspective, <marriage> is not the most important 
public policy to pursue.  Furthermore, efforts by a white, male dominated leadership to 
impose their policy choices onto the diverse LGBTQ community have created a 
complicated patchwork of court decisions that have redefined <marriage> as strictly 
white and male.  Warner (1999b) suggests this in his assessment that “the campaign for 
marriage, never a broad-based movement among gay and lesbian activists, depended for 
its success on the courts. It was launched by a relatively small number of lawyers, not by 
a consensus among activists” (p. 85). 
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 Critical race theorists have long argued that the law de facto marginalizes people of 
color because the law is created and propagated by the dominant white culture.  As 
Delgado and Stefancic explain, “the usual way society does business, the common, 
everyday experience of most people of color in this country” is one in which “racism is 
ordinary, not aberrational—‘normal science’” (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001, p. 7).  The 
law and everyday life surrounding <marriage> is the focus of this thesis.  Since 
<marriage> is an ideograph, it allows resistance where Warner only sees ideology.  At the 
same time, it offers an additional perspective on the ways in which <marriage> contains 
and controls sexual and kinship practices at the expense of some bodies.
    To extend Grindstaff and critique Warner, I blend the study of ideographs with the 
practice of autohistoria to access both public and private texts and public and private 
embodied acts with the aim of offering resistance to dominant understandings of  
<marriage> in the law and in everyday life.  In the next chapter, I trace <marriage> 
through queer theory to construct <marriage> as a heteronormative process of masculine 
agency and as raced.  In the second chapter, I discuss how this thesis observes moments 
of queer resistance between the law and the everyday by placing public and private 
archival texts in juxtaposition to public and private repertoires to observe queer of color 
resistance in <marriage>.  The third chapter, which combines rhetorical analysis and 
autobiographical performance to engage the tensions between the law and everyday life, 
offers my autohistoria of <marriage>.  Finally in a concluding chapter, I draw on 
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metaphors in the tradition of the shaman to discuss how my project contributes to rhetoric 
and performance studies scholarship by utilizing <marriage> as a reparative theory. 
14
Chapter Two: <Marriage> as Raced: A Politics of Shame, or Re-membering 
Nepantla
If we have been gagged and disempowered by theories, we can also be loosened 
and empowered by theories. (Keating, 2009, p. 137)
	
 This literature review of queer theory and its theorizations of <marriage> for the 
LGBTQ community must be framed as an act of re-membering to loosen the gags of 
theory and to empower.  Hames-García & Martínez (2011), in their introduction to Gay 
Latino Studies: A Critical Reader, similarly frame the collected works assembled within 
their anthology as an act of re-membering, drawing on work by Carribean feminist M. 
Jacqui Alexander, to indicate an agenda for gay latino studies (p. 3).  “Re-membering 
asks us to bring together a coalitional body that has been dis-membered by a history of 
ideological violence.  In actively resisting that history of violence we are able not only to 
remember a history of conflict and coalition but also to re-member possibilities for 
collaboration in the present” (Hames-García & Martínez, 2011, p. 4).  In other words, this 
purposeful act of framing is meant to position myself and this study into a particular 
space within a larger narrative on queer theory and <marriage> for LGBTQ couples.
	
 Several political and historical binaries surround <marriage>.  One of those binaries 
is the question: are you for or against gay <marriage>?  This divisive question leads to an 
engagement of either identity or morality in LGBTQ politics (Chavez, 2004; Miceli, 
2005) and/or means making decisions on whether to take up a queer or quare theoretical 
positionality (Johnson, 2001).  Additionally, a scholar must pick a disciplinary stronghold 
from which to engage queer theory and <marriage>, which in my case means choosing 
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between rhetoric, performance studies, or intercultural communication.  In order to 
loosen theory and move to a space of empowerment, we need to break out of these 
traditional framings of queer theory and LGBTQ politics by occupying a liminal position 
that is not quite here nor there termed nepantla.   Therefore, entering queer theory 
through <marriage> means engaging with several binaries intersectionally. 
	
 In the following literature review, I trace queer theory from rhetoric to performance 
to cultural studies and back again to position my <marriage> politics within a nepantla 
space to re-member and theorize academic contributions from/with queer people of color.  
Nepantla is a “Náhuatl word meaning ‘in-between space’” and is a term for liminality in 
queer Chicana feminist literature that “represents temporal, spacial, psychic, and/or 
intellectual point(s) of crisis” (Keating, 2009, p. 322).  Nepantla is an indigenous concept 
theorized from by queer Chicana feminists (Keating, 2009; Carrillo Rowe, 2008, 2009) 
and re-members a history and culture of ideological conflict and coalition that is useful 
for building collaborations in the present.  It is from a nepantla space that I engage queer 
theory as an academic and this thesis on <marriage> for LGBTQ couples.
	
 In the first section, I show the heteronormative dimensions of <marriage> by 
reviewing Michael Warner’s construction of a politics of shame.  In the next section, I 
explicate Davin Grindstaff’s utilization of ideographs that rebuts Warner by 
conceptualizing <marriage> as a performative process of masculine agency.  Working 
from a nepantla space, I interrupt Warner and Grindstaff’s ideological constructions by 
theorizing <marriage> as an intersectional hegemonic power structure.  In reviewing 
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works from whiteness studies, queer people of color scholarship, and communication 
theory, I show that  there are multiple conceptions of <marriage> that co-exist 
simultaneously.  In doing so, I challenges queer scholars to engage <marriage> as a space 
for theorization and praxis. 
<Marriage> as a Process of Heteronormativity
 In this first section, I show the heteronormative dimensions of  <marriage> by 
reviewing Michael Warner and his rhetorical construction of a politics of shame.  By 
critiquing the national gay movement, the national gay media, and its most visible 
spokespersons as agents of heteronormativity, Michael Warner (1999b) constructed a 
politics of shame that “distorts everything, from marriage law to public health policy, 
censorship, and even urban zoning” (p. 24-25).  In his article “Normal and Normaller: 
Beyond Gay Marriage” and in his book The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the 
Ethics of Queer Life, Warner pushed against the popular and academic mainstream by 
suggesting that LGBTQ campaigns for <marriage> equality operated with a 
heteronormative sensibility.  This critique against <marriage> for LGBTQ couples was 
published after the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996 and the 
subsequent years in which each U.S. state created separate laws to govern <marriage> for 
LGBTQ relationships.  His work on normalization and shame continues to be the pre-
eminent point of entry and burden to all queer scholars engaging in <marriage> studies.
 To critique what we mean by “normal,” Warner links shame to sexual stigma and 
problematizes what he sees as the abandonment of the sexual revolution roots of the 
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LGBTQ movement.  Embarrassed by their sexual desires and lacking institutions of 
collective memory and information transmission like straight culture, Warner argued that 
the LGBTQ movement is at the mercy of a politics of shame that restricts the possibilities 
of both hetero- and homo-sexual liberation.  Warner (1999a) asserts that the LGBTQ 
movement began in 1970 with the Stonewall riots in New York City and centered on the 
need to resist state regulation of sexuality (Warner, 1999a, p. 123).  He argues that so 
long as people enter into <marriage>, the state will continue to regulate everyone’s sexual 
lives including those who are not married (p. 127).  However, LGBTQ policy makers and 
LGBTQ media, whom Warner classifies as normalized queers in power positions 
sanctioned by the dominant culture, are working to erase the movements’ involvement in 
sexual liberation and thus “queer culture's best insights on intimate relations, sex, and the 
politics of stigma” (Warner, 1999b, p. 91).  Shame, through sexual stigma, then becomes 
the vehicle for normalization.
 Lawrence La Fountain-Stokes (2011), a gay puerto rican cultural scholar, explains 
that shame emerged as an early vehicle for queer theorization in the 1990s (p. 61).  Queer 
(white) theorists, such as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Michael Warner, discussed shame 
differently, and indeed, La Fountain-Stokes (2011) reminds readers that “meanings of gay 
shame vary among academics and even among different activists” (p. 61).  For Sedgwick 
(2002), shame is an affect maintained through repetitive acts of performativity and is 
directly related to identity and thus politics.  However, for Warner (1999b), shame is 
problematic precisely because it engages in identity politics, or as he describes, “it is to 
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challenge the stigma of identity, but only by reinforcing the shame of sex” (p. 31).  At 
every opportunity, Warner links shame to sexual stigma to construct an ideology that 
encompasses the entire LGBTQ movement.  A politics of shame demonstrates how a 
stigmaphobic society regulates and propagates <marriage> to the detriment of 
stigmaphile communities.  In other words, a politics of shame renders gay <marriage> a 
means used by the dominant culture to normalize gay cultures.
 Since heterosexuality is the dominant culture with exclusive privileges, <marriage> 
produces and reproduces the heteronormative privileging of certain sex acts (i.e., private, 
loving, heterosexual) and certain gender role constructs (i.e., masculine/feminine).  “By 
heteronormativity [I] mean the institutions, structures of understanding, and practical 
orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent--that is, organized as a 
sexuality--but also privileged” (Berlant and Warner, 1998, p. 548).  Warner (1999a) lists 
legal privilege after legal privilege that those in <marriage> enjoy over other forms of 
coupling and kinship (p. 141-142).  Additionally, Warner (1999b) shows how the 
institution of <marriage> shames those who are not in <marriage> contracts (e.g., 
divorced, single, widowed) or those who perform <marriage> out of the sexual or gender 
role norms (e.g., swingers).  He concludes that “even though people think that 
<marriage> gives them validation, legitimacy, and recognition, they somehow think that 
it does so without invalidating, delegitimating, or stigmatizing other relations, needs, and 
desires” (Warner, 1999a, p. 133). 
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 LGBTQ policy makers, in order to pursue <marriage> equality, have locked the 
movement into identity frames that do not address the heteronormative politics of shame.  
Warner (1999b) asserts that “the more you are willing to articulate political issues in a 
way that plays to a normal audience, the more success you are likely to have” (p. 44).  By 
rearticulating LGBTQ political issues to appeal to a wider “normal” audience, LGBTQ 
policy makers are abandoning the sexual revolution roots and indoctrinating the 
movement into the very ideology that it was created to resist.  As Warner (1999b) 
reminds us, “gay political groups owe their very being to the fact that sex draws people 
together and that in doing so it suggests alternative possibilities of life” (p. 47).  LGBTQ 
national organizations and media are moving farther and farther away from their sexual 
deviant constituents in order to achieve privileged status for a select few (Warner, 1999a, 
1999b).  <Marriage> is thus a heteronormative process that, Warner argues, should be 
abandoned as a public policy agenda for the LGBTQ community.
<Marriage> as a Process of Masculine Agency
	
 In the following section, I explicate Davin Grindstaff’s utilization of ideographs 
that rebuts Warner by conceptualizing <marriage> as a performative process of masculine 
agency.  Grindstaff (2003) rebuts Warner’s view of <marriage> as a structure located 
solely within the state apparatus and the legal institution of <marriage> and posits that 
Warner too easily dismisses the performative aspects of <marriage> and thus eliminates 
all possibilities for agency (p. 259, 260).  Further, Warner’s overemphasis on state/legal 
power at the expense of the everyday embodied life creates a false premise that merely 
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rejecting <marriage> is resistance to heteronormativity (p. 260).  <Marriage> as a 
hegemonic power structure recuperates and normalizes all interlocutors regardless of 
embodied acts as well (Goltz & Zingheim, 2010).  Grindstaff tracked what he termed 
“performative ideographs,” tracked within scholarly books and articles on <marriage>, as 
a rhetorical tool to challenge Warner’s politics of shame and in doing so offered 
masculine agency as a performative alternative to heteronormativity.
	
 By tracking ideographs surrounding <marriage>, Grindstaff rhetorically constructs 
a process of masculine agency as a performative capable of resistance through repetitive 
everyday acts.  Performative ideographs offer resistance to Warner’s arguments because a 
performative turn to the ideographic method conceptualizes power as contingent not 
deterministic.  A performative turn recognizes an ideograph’s reliance on cultural 
conventions and advocates for repetition of performative ideographs as means of 
resistance (p. 262, 272).  Grindstaff’s work demonstrates how both <homosexual> and 
<heterosexual> when utilized beside <marriage> produced performances of masculine 
agency that push women and bisexual-/trans-people out of gay culture (p. 264-270).  He 
posits that “both sides of this ‘domestication of men’ debate crystallize heteronormative 
identity equations through the desire for masculine agency.  Most important, the 
character of this agency is contingent even though it appears to be foundational and 
necessary” (p. 270).  Masculine agency privileges the symbolic/institutional construction 
of <marriage> over the social practice (p. 267) and forecloses resistive opportunities that 
the everyday presents (p. 268).  In other words, it is a performative process of masculine 
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agency that causes heteronormativity in <marriage> not a politics of shame, and thus, it is 
possible to resist the heteronormativity inherent to <marriage> through repetitive 
everyday acts. 
	
 Although Grindstaff’s critique of Warner is accurate and although his performative 
ideographs do offer possibilities for resistance within <marriage>, Grindstaff ultimately 
bolsters Warner’s argument against <marriage> by failing to address a politics of shame.  
His rhetorical “leap of faith” that “homosexuality = promiscuity [HIV transmission] = 
death” and “heterosexuality = monogamy [marriage] = life [procreation]” (p. 269) 
relies on Warner’s construction of “normalization” and a “politics of shame” (i.e., 
promiscuity is shamed by monogamy).  Grindstaff states that “acknowledging how 
‘sexual freedom’ or absolute agency is a necessary condition for this rhetorical equation 
is most vital to our resistance to heteronormativity” (Grindstaff, 2003, p. 269).  In other 
words, Grindstaff finds promiscuity shameful.  This reliance on a politics of shame 
invokes the very identity politics that Warner cites as part of the normalization of 
LGBTQ politics. Put simply, Grindstaff is a “normalized queer” (Warner, 1999b, p. 91).
 I take a different approach than that of Grindstaff in my critique of Warner.  My 
approach, too, seeks to identify possibilities for resistance with <marriage>, but I argue 
that Warner fails to address race in his construction of <marriage>.  Warner does not 
acknowledge any investments in whiteness within his theorization of a politics of shame.  
Like Grindstaff, Warner conveniently (and invisibly) does not acknowledge how the 
LGBTQ movement invariably has a racial dimension (Chavez, 2004; Martin & 
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Nakayama, 2006).  These nuanced moves demonstrate a normalization of queer debate, 
dialogue, and theorizations surrounding <marriage> as “white,” “male,” and “gay.”  This 
thesis aims to make contemporary Warner’s argument by calling for a change in public 
policy for the LGBTQ community; however, this thesis also aims to decenter Warner’s 
argument by extending Grindstaff’s work with performative ideographs to address issues 
of race and culture in the construction of <marriage>.  As a married man, I dare not risk a 
full rejection of <marriage>, but I argue that addressing issues of race offers an 
opportunity to consider an LGBTQ public policy agenda beyond <marriage>.
<Marriage> as Raced
! From a nepantla space, I interrupt Warner’s top-down and Grindstaff’s bottom-up 
constructions of <marriage> by theorizing <marriage> as raced.  The LGBTQ 
community and the Christian Right are effectively locked into framings of identity and 
morality that have shutdown dialogue between these opposing movements (Chavez, 
2004; Miceli, 2005).  In terms of morality politics, “Christian Right groups strongly align 
their frames with religious and cultural definitions of the immorality of homosexuality to 
provide discursive power and legitimacy to their claim[s]” (Miceli, 2005, p. 598).  In 
other words, “in order to frame the issues in the most politically effective way for their 
group, they must remain in their separate political contexts.  To argue in their opponent’s 
political realm is to lose the ideological strength of their political framing strategy and 
thus weaken their own position” (Miceli, 2005, p. 591).
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 Works by queer theorists such as Warner, Grindstaff, Butler (1998), and Sedgwick 
are valuable, but there is a gap in queer theorizations precisely because whiteness is 
operating within the LGBTQ movement.  This realization does not have to be divisive; 
by acknowledging the racial dimensions of <marriage>, this thesis offers whiteness as a 
lens through which to view theorizations of <marriage> as having an investment in 
privileging white bodies.  The goal of whiteness studies is “to examine the space (and 
effect of that social space) that whiteness carries as a political identifier of difference” 
and “not to claim an essentialized white subject” (Warren, 1999, p. 193).  Whiteness is an 
invisible power structure that utilizes strategies such as positioning privilege within racial 
identity, engaging in discourse of white as a lack of other racial/ethnic features, 
naturalizing white as a scientific definition, confusing white with nationality (i.e., “I’m 
American” = white), engaging in discourse that resists ethnic identity labels (i.e., a 
struggle over who gets to label whom), or unreflexive relation to European ancestry 
(Nakayama & Krizek, 1995, p. 298- 302).  Furthermore, these strategies of whiteness are 
contradictory, and it is these very contradictions that allow whiteness “to maneuver 
through and around challenges to its space” or remain invisible (Nakayama & Krizek, 
1995, p. 302).  Accepting <marriage> as a raced relationship means making visible 
whiteness in the institution of <marriage> and in queer theorizations of <marriage> for 
LGBTQ couples.
 A revisit to Warner’s politics of shame through a lens of gay latino studies offers an 
example of the possibilities of accepting <marriage> as raced.  Lawrence La Fountain-
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Stokes (2011) defines gay shame, Latina- and Latino-style, as “among other things, the 
total and absolute lack of shame,” (p. 70) or sin vergüenza (without shame).  It is not that 
Latinas/os do not experience vergüenza (shame), but that it is a process of shaming that is 
culturally experienced.  For example, Gloria Anzaldúa, a Tejana/Chicana, describes 
experiencing vergüenza from her mother because of her dark brown skin color in 
opposition to her other siblings’ fair skin to explicate the lingering cultural codes from a 
colonial history with Spain and the United States (Keating, 2009, p. 38-50).  As such, gay 
shame, theorized Latina- and Latino-style, is not necessarily burdened with “sexual 
stigma” (Warner, 1999a, 1999b) or “affect” (Sedgwick, 2002) in ways experienced thus 
far because there is no direct correspondence to the term vergüenza in Anglo culture. 
 In theorizing a life sin vergüenza, there is a linguistic double-meaning in 
sinvergüenza (shamelessness), including a positive use of the term to connote “those who 
are quick-witted, clever, and do not cause great harm” (Moliner in La Fountain-Stokes, 
2011, p. 72).  Sinvergüenza “is to have no shame: to disobey, break the law, disrespect 
authority (the family, the church, the state), and in a perverse and curious way to be proud 
of one’s transgression, or at the very least lack a feeling of guilt” (La Fountain-Stokes, 
2011, p. 72).  It is a conception of shame that accepts race and class as a part of the 
process (García, 2011, p. 83).  Shifting to Latina- and Latino-style gay shame leads to an 
understanding of shame that gay Latinas/os have embraced as a label for social justice 
organizations; for example, sinvergüenzas “are sex radicals who do not uphold dominant 
conceptions of propriety and are not afraid to tread on delicate ground, claiming 
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pornography, erotica, s/m, and all types of physical expression as their own” (La 
Fountain-Stokes, 2011, p. 74).  Rather than use shame as an ideological tool of 
heteronormativity, which it is, Latino shame opens up possibilities for political mobility.  
Warner’s main fear is that practices like sinvergüenzas will disappear if LGBTQ couples 
marry, but his debilitating construction of shame is less useful to the project of resistance.
	
 Queer people of color offer a different perspective on sexual orientation that moves 
past the moralizing and identity politics that surround the <marriage> debate.  Essentially, 
a queer of color perspective implements identity politics within the LGBTQ community 
to address issues of gay hegemony (i.e., racial/class/gender struggles in the LGBTQ 
community).  Engaging in identity and morality politics from the perspective of queers of 
color means moving past debates over queer or quare theory.  E. Patrick Johnson (2001), 
a performance studies scholar, defines quare theory as “a theory of and for gays and 
lesbians of color” (p. 3) that “reinstate[s] the subject and the identity around which the 
subject circulates that queer theory so easily dismisses,” such as “racialized bodies, 
experiences, and knowledges” (p. 10).  A quare theorist is “committed to interrogating 
identity claims that exclude rather than include” (Johnson, 2001, p. 10) and must “ground 
discourse in materiality” (p. 11).  Indeed, quare theory is aligned directly with queer of 
color critiques that queer theory is a discipline of and for white gays and lesbians 
(Anzaldúa, 1987; Keating, 2009; Calafell, 2007; Calafell & Moreman, 2009; Chavez, 
2004; García, 2011; Hames-García & Martínez, 2011; Johnson, 2001, 2008; La Fountain-
Stokes, 2011; Moraga, 1997, 2011; Muñoz, 1999; Rodríguez, 2006).
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 Nepantla as a liminal space is a construction of queer theory that predates the 
queer/quare debate and allows an intersectional analysis of <marriage>.  E. Patrick 
Johnson (2001) draws on work pioneered by Gloria Anzaldúa with “theories in the flesh,”  
which “conjoin[s] theory and practice though an embodied politics of resistance,” (p. 3-4) 
to construct his quare theory.  This type of identity politics “acknowledges difference 
within and between particular groups” and “does not necessarily mean the reduction of 
multiple identities into a monolithic identity or narrow cultural nationalism” (Johnson, 
2001, p. 9).  Theories in the flesh seek to “de-academize theory and [aims] to connect the 
community to the academy” (Keating, 2009, p. 137).  Rather than position this work in 
queer or quare theory, I choose to draw on the ontology of queer, Chicana feminist 
literature whose work from the 1960s to the present informed conceptions of both queer 
theory and quare theory. 
	
 For example, a queer subject is conceptualized as one who resists or elides 
categorization to disavow constrictive binaries, and as such, queer includes any subject 
that is considered an oddity or strange because the subject does not conform to traditional 
framings within a particular context (Johnson, 2008).  Gloria Anzaldúa informed queer 
theory from an indigenous conception of spirituality that emphasized the 
interconnectivity between subjects and used ambiguity as a method for theorization 
(Keating, 2009, p. 163-175).  For example, she drew on indigenous beliefs and 
knowledges of the spirit to developed concepts such as nepantla, mestizaje, and spiritual 
activism to create a non-western epistemology for people of color (Keating, 2009).  
Choosing to draw from Chicana feminism as an ontology avoids the queer/quare debate 
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by returning to an intersectional conception that predates both and does not force me to 
identify with one or the other.  Nepantla is a spiritually inflected conception of queer 
theory that is both racial and political but not exclusively either because it is focused on 
our interconnected and intersectional bodies.
	
  While I am interested in the racial dimensions of <marriage>, I do not believe 
<marriage> is a political project solely because it is a racialized institution.  Whether gay 
or straight, <marriage> is a relationship that is deeply political due to the legal and social 
privileges that <marriage> propagates.  As Warner (1999a) reminds us, <marriage> is 
“the central legitimating institution by which the state penetrates the sexuality of its 
subjects” (p. 128), and “since the 1993 March on Washington, marriage has come to 
dominate the political imagination of the national gay movement” (p. 120).  As such, 
<marriage> as a public/private institution is a relationship forged through communicative 
acts and therefore, is an act of political participation.  Todd Kelshaw (2006) reflects that 
“being political is not a prohibited thing, a choice, or an obligation; it is a condition. The 
root question is not whether we choose or have the power to behave politically, but 
whether we recognize the political consequences of our minute-to-minute 
interactions” (p. 161).  Therefore, <marriage> because of its ties to the LGBTQ 
movement, its use as a vehicle of subjugation by the state, and its inherent construction 
through communicative acts makes this particular relationship always and only political.
  Race like political participation is always a part of communication, and therefore, 
<marriage> as a relationship constituted through communication is raced.  Judith Martin 
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and Thomas Nakayama (2006) explain that “with whom we communicate, when we 
communicate with them, and how much we communicate with others follows largely 
racialized formations” (p. 76).  Even though scientists have discredited physiological/
biological notions of race, “it is real--and it is this cultural contradiction that undergirds 
our conversations on race and its place in communication studies” (Martin & Nakayama, 
2006, p. 76).  Although the strategic and performative rhetoric of whiteness has elided the 
commonly understood notion that <marriage> is raced, this thesis aims to repair this 
oversight. 
 From a space of Nepantla, I have reviewed works from whiteness studies, queer 
people of color scholarship, and communication theory to re-member that there are 
multiple conceptions of <marriage> that co-exist simultaneously, and challenge queer 
scholars to engage <marriage> as space for theorization and praxis.  Critiques by queer 
people of color, critical intercultural communication scholars, and whiteness studies 
scholars verify that queer theory, communication, and <marriage> for LGBTQ couples 
are projects with a strategic investment in whiteness (Lipsitz, 1998), and therefore, there 
is a need for <marriage> to be theorized from a perspective that allows for an accounting 
of race.  By occupying a liminal space of nepantla, I have tried to maneuver between and 
betwixt the many binaries and power structures involved in <marriage> for LGBTQ 
couples to offer a literature review that opens up debate surrounding <marriage> rather 
than locking dialogue into unproductive framings.  Although the LGBTQ movement is 
locked in several political frames (i.e., for or against gay <marriage>, identity vs. 
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morality, queer vs. quare), there is space for a conception of <marriage> that does not 
embrace a monolithic/univocal ideology.  If <marriage> is engaged as an ideograph 
through the approach of autohistoria, then re-membering nepantla becomes a reparative 
tool to disrupt power structures. 
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Chapter Three: <Marriage> as an Archive and a Repertoire, or Autohistoria as 
Methodology
 To observe moments of queer resistance between the law and the everyday, this 
method chapter places public and private text in juxtaposition to public and private 
embodied acts to track <marriage> in the archive and the repertoire.  In the first section, I 
define the public and private archival texts and the public and private repertoires utilized 
in my autohistoria of <marriage> to give an example of how an ideographic analysis with 
text only or embodied forms only cannot encapsulate my <marriage>.  In the final 
section, I offer autohistoria as an intersectional approach that juxtaposes rhetorical 
analysis of text and embodied acts to track moments of queer resistance in <marriage> 
between the law and the everyday.
<Marriage> as an Archive and a Repertoire 
 In this first section, I define the public and private archival texts and the public 
and private repertoires utilized in my autohistoria of <marriage> to give an example of 
how an ideographic analysis with text only or embodied forms only cannot encapsulate 
my <marriage>.  In terms of its performativity, something is made archival in “the 
process whereby it is selected, classified, and presented for analysis” (Taylor, 2003, p. 
19); or in other words, there is a body doing the archiving.  Since <marriage> gains its 
legitimacy in the world of text as well as in embodied forms, this thesis needs an 
approach to interrogating <marriage> in both the archive and the repertoire. 
 The public texts I examine are Baehr v. Lewin, Baehr v. Miike, Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), Mini-DOMA legislation, Baker v. Vermont, Goodridge v. 
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Department of Public Health, Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, City and 
County of San Francisco v. California, In re Marriage Cases, and Proposition 8 (Ca. 
Const. art. I, § 7.5).  These court cases and legislative acts were selected because each 
one (re)defined <marriage> through the law.  For example, Proposition 8, the California 
Constitutional Amendment that ended <marriage> for LGBTQ couples, directly 
threatened to destroy my <marriage> based not on the will of my partner and I but on 
public opinion.  My legal <marriage> license is sitting on the wall in front of me as I type 
these words onto the page, yet this legal relationship is constantly under threat of being 
invalidated by court mandate.  How would you start forging a life with someone knowing 
that at any point a law could interrupt your everyday life?  <Marriage> laws surrounding 
these public texts regulate queer bodies of all colors, but by including private texts with 
public texts, I can observe moments of resistance to the law.
	
  The private texts I examine include pictures, poems, emails, letters, and videos 
surrounding my <marriage> with a gay Latino male.  To be more specific, I include 
moments from my wedding video, poems written about my experiences after Proposition 
8 passed, private notes and correspondence, and private pictures from a rally I attended in 
defense of my <marriage>.  By tracking the definitional changes to <marriage> over time 
and in specific moments of these public and private texts, I can offer an analysis of 
ideographs in the archive that observe moments of resistance. 
	
 In my autohistoria, I analyze my own <marriage> ceremony and celebration as a 
public repertoire.  However, I also analyze private repertoires to flesh out the scenario of 
my <marriage> with scenes only I could know, such as moments with my family before 
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and after the separation of my parents’ <marriage>, how I met my husband, and secret 
memories from during and after my <marriage>.  By observing how <marriage> is 
performed both publicly and privately, I want to illuminate moments of resistance within 
the repertoire.
 For example, Dustin Bradley Goltz and Jason Zingheim (2010), in their article, 
“It’s Not a Wedding, It’s a Gayla: Queer Resistance and Normative Recuperation,” 
attempt to resist <marriage> through the repertoire by enacting cultural performatives 
meant to queer the <marriage> ceremony.  A Gayla is “a political performance project of 
love, community, protest, and activism that enacted a series of performative rituals that 
reconfigure[s] and celebrate[s] queer notions of family and relations, both working to 
expose the violences embedded within heteronormative marriage rituals and create a 
space that gestured towards queer futurity” (p. 291).  Goltz and Zingheim (2010) 
attempted to disrupt heteronormative repertoires of <marriage> by asking couples to sit 
separately (p. 295), providing personalized “conversation starter” questions for guests 
behind their name tag, such as recounting an orgy participated in by Goltz and Zingheim 
(p. 296), and peeing the names of guests publicly on the backyard wall (p. 299).  For this 
thesis, I explore the repertoires of my wedding (notice the lack of Gayla) documenting 
and theorizing on a queer of color performance of <marriage>.
 I do not want to begin a gay war over whose <marriage> or Gayla is better, but 
the differences between our queer scenes within the scenario of <marriage> highlight 
privilege and resistance.  “Scene denotes intentionality, artistic or otherwise (the scene of 
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the crime), and signals conscious strategies of display” (Taylor, 2003, p. 29).  For 
example, Goltz and Zingheim’s (2010) event was a “weekend-long Gayla celebration” 
that consisted of a “‘Bacchanalia’ (‘old school’ keg party) at Dusty’s parents’ house 
Friday evening,” then “The Garden Party” or “drinks by the hotel pool” that led into “The 
Feast” (“everyone should come in togas”), and finally, “The Soiree” or a night of dancing 
and drinking at a local gay club (p. 292-293).  On August 10th, 2007, my wedding took 
place at the Morgan Hill Community Center in a suburban city just outside of San José, 
California from 5 - 11PM, and my wedding scene included a ceremony in the attached 
rose garden followed by a reception and dinner.  Or, did it happen on July 1st, 2008 at the 
Santa Clara County Courthouse followed by a barbecue in my backyard with close family  
and friends?  Sorting out the differences between the scenes of a Gayla, my wedding, and 
my civil <marriage> highlights queer resistance, but yet, these scenes insists on an 
accountability for the material privileges inherent to a weekend-long multi-event 
celebration and a 150-guest wedding (not to mention a second celebration less than a year 
later).  Therefore, a scenario is not “necessarily, or even primarily mimetic” (Taylor, 
2003, p. 31-32) thus enabling queer resistance through disidentification. 
 For instance, Jose Esteban Muñoz (1999), in Disidentifications: Queers of Color 
and the Performance of Politics, defines disidentification as “the survival strategies the 
minority subject practices in order to negotiate a phobic majoritarian public sphere that 
continuously elides or punishes the existence of subjects who do not conform to the 
phantasm of normative citizenship” (p. 4).  This form of queer resistance does not dispel 
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ideology but works within it to invest it with new life (Muñoz, 1999, p. 12).  
Disidentification is a process of “‘working on and against’” by identifying yet 
disidentifying with an object simultaneously that resists through “ambivalent modality 
that cannot be conceptualized as a restrictive or ‘masterfully’ fixed mode of 
identification” (Muñoz, 1999, p. 28).  Disidentification is not about being apolitical or 
side-stepping an issue; it is a “theory in the flesh” utilized by queers of color that has 
been well-documented in academia (Calafell, 2007; Chávez, 2009; Johnson, 2001, 2008; 
Muñoz, 1999).  As a form of political ambiguity, disidentification is in line with the 
theoretical nepantla space that I explicated in my literature review.
 This ideographic analysis includes performative as well as archival examples 
because an analysis that only includes the repertoire is just as problematic as an archive-
only analysis.  Halualani, Mendoza & Drzewiecka (2009) remind us that “culture needs 
to be understood both in its enduring sedimentations (the deposits and traces left by 
historical contestations) and in its radical transformations and itineraries as it travels and 
enters into translations within specific localized contexts and toward differing goals” (p. 
23).  Indeed, Taylor (2003) conceived of scenarios, especially in the passing on of 
scenarios, as needing to draw of various modes of both the archive and repertoire (e.g., 
writing, dance, singing, reenactment) (p. 31).  For example, Goltz and Zingheim (2010) 
included pictures of themselves in white togas with “nipples hard from the cool winter 
air, standing on a garbage can and leaning against a bus stop downtown” on the back of 
their Gayla invitations.  These pictures are part of the archive, yet without the archive, an 
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analysis of the repertoire would leave out important contextual sedimentations of culture 
or miss important traces of cultural identity.  Any examination of <marriage> as a cultural 
performance must include the archive or risk missing key components of the scenario.
 Additionally, a repertoire-only analysis falls just as easily into a binary.  Taylor 
(2003) concedes that the archive and the repertoire “too readily falls into a binary, with 
the written and archival constituting hegemonic power and the repertoire providing the 
anti-hegemonic challenge” (p. 22).  However, Taylor (2003) further explains that one 
needs only to look at history to understand that the repertoire is not a utopia of counter-
hegemony.  For example, “the broad range of political practices in the Americas 
exercised on human bodies, from pre-conquest human sacrifices, to Inquisitorial burnings 
at the stake, to the lynchings of African Americans, to contemporary acts of state-
sponsored torture and disappearances” (Taylor, 2003, p. 22) show how the repertoire is a 
site of oppression as well as resistance.  Indeed, West’s (2008) work on queer bodies in 
public and private texts was conceived using Taylor’s conception of the repertoire, so an 
ideographic analysis of the law and the everyday must include both the archive and the 
repertoire.  As Taylor reminds us, “innumerable practices in the most literate societies 
require both an archival and embodied dimension: weddings need both the performative 
utterance of “I do” and the signed contract; the legality of a court decision lies in the 
combination of the live trial and the recorded outcome; the performance of a claim 
contributes to its legality” (Taylor, 2003, p. 21).
	
 I want to offer a personal example for including an analysis of both the archive 
and the repertoire in the analysis of <marriage> to make this point more visceral.  Prior to 
36
my wedding ceremony, I privately prepared the logistics for a 150-guest wedding and 
reception.  I stuffed envelopes with invitations, licked them closed one-by-one, hopefully 
wrote each name and address, then stamped and sent them off into the world.  An analysis 
of public and private text could be fruitful in this example, but it would not allow me to 
analyze the repertoires of rejection and suppression that occurred after my invitations 
reached their addresses.  My grandfather and my partner’s father and brother did not 
attend our illegal wedding and reception.  It is not that we needed witnesses to make this 
ceremony real but that there was a performance with bodies that included text.  How can 
tweezing these two important aspects apart produce a valid analysis of <marriage>?
	
 In the following section, I offer autohistoria as an intersectional approach that 
juxtaposes rhetorical analysis of text and embodied acts to track moments of queer 
resistance in <marriage> between the law and the everyday.  As explained in the previous 
section, <marriage> as an ideograph exists in the archive and the repertoire therefore an 
analysis only in the archive or only in the repertoire misses important moments that an 
analysis of both can begin to grasp.  But, how can you encapsulate a moment of 
embodiment, which is by definition ephemeral, and text, which in U.S. law, is inherently 
racist.  Even queer academic scholarship and popular media as text is invested in 
whiteness, so how can you observe moments of resistance in <marriage> with such 
normalizing texts?  The answer: autohistoria.
<Marriage> as Autohistoria
	
 Autohistoria is an intersectional approach developed by Chicana feminist 
scholarship that utilizes autobiographical performance and performative writing to blend 
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genres of writing in text that are kept separate by western notions of knowledge (Hurtado, 
1998).  Given the immense power and the multiple systems influenced by <marriage>, 
the deployment of an autohistoria is meant to be an “intersectional strategy” or a “critical 
hermeneutics that register[s] the copresence of sexuality, race, class, gender, and other 
identity differentials as particular components that exist simultaneously with one 
another” (Crenshaw in Muñoz, 1999, p. 99).  Autohistoria is similar and different to 
autoethnography and autoperformance because it is a form of autobiographical 
performance that operates as a live political document to offer resistance through 
“theories in the flesh.” 
 Autohistoria is a qualitative method similar to autoethnography, but autohistoria 
takes a performance perspective on theorizing the body. Autoethnography “is a mode of 
writing that privileges reflexivity—it demands that one slow down the everyday doings of 
a moment...to see the machinery at play within the mundane landscapes of our 
lives” (Warren & Fassett, 2011, p. 103).  An autohistorian must acknowledge their 
intersectional privileges (e.g., race, sexual orientation, gender, class, (dis)ability); or, “in 
other words, when we live our lives, we often fail to see the ways institutions are at play 
in and through us. This kind of blindness is not individual, but part of the way social 
systems elide their own mechanisms of power” (Warren & Fassett, 2011, p. 103).  If an 
autohistorian does not engage privilege than it is engaging in autoethnography that  
uncritically (re)inscribes dominant power structures, such as whiteness or the law 
(Calafell & Moreman, 2009; Holman Jones, 2005; Warren & Fassett, 2011). But, 
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autohistoria is similar and different from autoperformance because it is rooted in a 
different understanding of performance.
 My body is mestizo and queer, and autohistoria draws from a non-western 
epistemology of performance that recognizes my body’s roots in Latin America, Africa, 
Asia, Europe, and Aztlán.  Taylor (2003) explores the various meanings of performance 
in performance studies and the Americas and the problematics of translating a term with 
no equivalent in Spanish and indigenous languages (p. 5-13).  She indicates that 
performance is known as performance art in these languages or as having political power, 
which western notions of performance do not naturally have within the language (Taylor, 
2003, p. 12 -13).  Or, in other words, autohistoria utilizes autobiographical performance 
to create a “live” document with the specific performative goal of change for social 
justice. 
	
 For a thesis that seeks to (re)define <marriage>, the autohistoria approach is one 
of the few tools queer of color scholars and women of color feminists can utilize to resist 
dominant narratives.  This embrace of autobiographical writing is in line with Dwight 
Conquergood’s (1991) call for a more critical/cultural ethnography that returns to the 
body, addresses boundaries and borderlands, turns to performance, and includes 
rhetorical reflexivity (p. 180).  Latina/o cultural scholars, also, embrace autobiographical 
and performance writing to present/analyze research on Latina/o performativities such as 
brownness, latinidad, Chicanismo, and mestizaje (Arrendondo, Hurtado, Klahn, Nájera-
Ramírez, & Zavella, 2003; Calafell, 2005; Calafell, 2007; Calafell & Moreman, 2009, 
2010; Davalos, 2008; Delgado, 2009; Dicochea, 2004).  Additionally, queer Latina/o and 
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Chicana/o scholarship  embrace autobiographical writing to theorize from Latina/o 
subjectivities (Anzaldúa, 1987, Keating, 2009; Coronado, 2006; Hames-García & 
Martínez, 2011; Moraga, 1997, 2011; Muñoz, 1999; Pérez, 2011).  My autohistoria draws 
from this literature to create a political document that seeks to resist dominant narratives 
with my writing.
 Drawing from Gloria Anzaldúa and Bernadette Marie Calafell, this thesis utilizes 
performative writing techniques, such as breaking up archival analysis with poetry, to 
create this autohistoria of <marriage>.  For example, in her book Borderlands/La 
Frontera: The New Mestiza, Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) utilized many performative writing 
techniques as a specific act of resistance to white, white feminist, and Chicano 
traditionalists/sexists.  Following this seminal work in the epistemology of autohistoria, 
“I jerk the reader around by also code-switching in genre: mixing genres, crossing genres 
from poetry to essay to narrative to a little bit of analysis and theory” (Keating, 2009, p. 
189-190):
Understand.
My family is poor.
Poor. I can't afford
a new ribbon. The risk
of this one is enough
to keep me moving
through it, accountable.
The repetition like my mother's
stories retold, each time
reveals more particulars
gains more familiarity.
You can't get me in your car so fast.
(Moraga in Keating, 2009, p. 29)
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  Following Calafell’s (2007) work, I do not separate the realities of my body (i.e., 
race, class, ability, sexual orientation, etc.) from my rhetorical analyses, so I can create 
“theories in the flesh.”  Latina/o communication studies scholars (Calafell, 2007; Moreira 
& Diversi, 2011; Moreman & Persona Non Grata, 2011) invoke autobiographical 
“theories of the flesh,” which “means one where the physical realities of our lives--our 
skin color, the land or concrete we grew up on, our sexual longing--all fuse to create a 
politic born out of necessity.  Here we attempt to bridge the contradictions of our 
experience” (Anzaldúa and Moraga in Calafell, 2007, p. 7), to participate, like this thesis, 
in the political project of social transformation.  <Marriage> is always and already 
political, and my <marriage> as an autohistoria takes an intersectional approach that 
juxtaposes rhetorical analysis of text and embodied acts to track moments of queer 
resistance in <marriage> between the law and the everyday.
	
 To observe moments of queer resistance between the law and the everyday, this 
method chapter places public and private archival text in juxtaposition to public and 
private repertoires to track queer resistance to <marriage>.  As I am attempting to 
disidentify and identify with <marriage> intersectionally, I aim to simultaneously enact 
modes of queer resistances, such as theories in the flesh and disidentification. I have done 
the work of re-membering different theoretical, disciplinary, and socio-political histories 
of <marriage> in the law and the everyday.  However, it is up to you (the reader) to move 
beyond text and body, the archive and the repertoire, identity vs. morality politics, and 
any other false binary surrounding <marriage> by grappling with the way(s) in which you 
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are accountable for the current state of <marriage> and taking action to heal our/your 
wounds.
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Chapter Four: (Re)defining <Marriage>: Entering Nepantla...
	
 <Marriage> is a deeply personal and political object of study; therefore, it 
becomes necessary to present <marriage> in both personal and political terms.  Sharing 
the various ways my brown skin joins with another’s brown skin sends electricity down 
my spine.  I am scared to enter a state of nepantla and use myself as a “fulcrum subject” 
to be “between the study and the experience” because it means I must “be here and 
nowhere, in the moment and off the clock” (Corey & Nakayama, 1997, p. 58).  In 
Chicana feminist literature, a rhetor engaging in autohistoria relies on emotions to 
construct rhetorics of the body, or “theories of the flesh” (Anzaldúa in Calafell, 2007).  
To enter nepantla, you must take apart your privileges, break down your fears, and 
dismember your entire being.  From this scattering of identity tensions, you must 
discover how to put yourself back together, often in new ways, and emerge from nepantla 
reborn with a new perspective and a new performative repertoire to affect a political 
change in the world.  This on-going, never-ending process of identity construction is the 
Coyolxauhqui imperative, and it terrifies me. 
Coyolxauhqhi (Ko-yol-sha-UH-kee), also called “la diosa de la luna” (goddess of 
the moon), was Coatlicue’s oldest daughter. After her mother was impregnated by 
a ball of feathers, Coyolxauhqui encouraged her four hundred brothers and sisters 
to kill Coatlicue. As they  attacked their mother, the fetus, Huitzilopochtli, sprang 
fully  grown and armed from Coatlicue, tore Coyolxauhqui into over a thousand 
pieces, flung her head into the sky, and killed her siblings. (Keating, 2009, p. 320)
 The Coyolxauhqui imperative symbolizes the continuous and always political 
process of identity negotiation with larger cultural-structural systems, such as the law.  
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Like Coyolxauhqui, an autohistoria asks the autohistorian to enter the nepantla state to 
rip their identity into pieces.  To be within the nepantla state is to feel disoriented in 
space or “to be disoriented in space is to experience bouts of dissociation of identity, 
identity break-downs and buildups” (Keating, 2009, p. 180-181).  In nepantla, an 
autohistorian must re-assemble the pieces of their identity in new ways to return to a state 
of wholeness. The Coyolxauqui imperative is “a self-healing process, an inner 
compulsion or desire to move from fragmentation to complex wholeness” (Keating, 
2009, p. 320) that represents the beginning and ending of this autohistoria.
<Marriage> as LGBTQ Politics
	
 In December of 1990, three same-sex couples applied for <marriage> licenses in 
the State of Hawaii and were denied.  Ninia Baehr and Genora Dancel, Tammy Rodrigues 
and Antoinette Pregil, and Pat Lagon and Joseph Melilio immediately filed a complaint 
on May 1, 1991 “alleging that denial of licenses violated their right to privacy and equal 
protection as guaranteed by the Hawaii Constitution”  (Baehr v. Lewin, 1993, p. 44).  In 
1993, the Hawaiian Supreme Court decided in Baehr v. Lewin "that denying same-sex 
couples legal marriage went against the sex-based discrimination clause of the Hawaii 
State Constitution" (Grindstaff, 2003, p. 258), and sent the case to a lower constitutional 
court to determine whether or not the state had a compelling interest in banning same-sex 
<marriage>.  This ruling catapulted <marriage> for LGBTQ couples into the mainstream 
of U.S. society and can be pointed to as the beginning of the modern <marriage> equality 
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movement; in fact, this entire decade of LGBTQ politics is a response to this 
controversial ruling. 
	
 Although Baehr v. Lewin sparked a national debate in 1993, the case continued in 
Baehr v. Miike in 1996 and ended when the people of Hawaii approved a constitutional 
amendment banning <marriage> for LGBTQ couples in 1998.  Baehr v. Lewin “was the 
first time that any court, let alone the highest court of a state, held that a state must justify 
its reasons for denying marriage to same-sex couples,” (Sant’Ambrogio & Law, 2011, p. 
8) and in Baehr v. Miike (1996), the state contended that it had a compelling interest to 
restrict <marriage> from LGBTQ couples because the state must protect the health and 
welfare of children, foster procreation within a marital setting, secure/assure recognition 
of Hawaii <marriages> in other jurisdictions, protect the economy from the foreseeable 
effects of same-sex <marriage>, and protect civil liberties (including foreseeable effects 
of same-sex <marriage> approval).  The Hawaiian State Supreme Court did not rule on 
the appeal to Baehr v. Miike until December 9, 1999, but prior to the hearing, Hawaii 
voters approved a constitutional amendment to deny <marriage> to LGBTQ couples. 
This constitutional amendment states: “the legislature shall have the power to reserve 
marriage to opposite-sex couples” (Hi. Const. art. I, § 23), and on November 3rd, 1998, 
Hawaiian voters approved the amendment with 69.2% yes votes and 28.6% no votes 
(Hawaii Office of Elections, 1998).  Taking this constitutional amendment into judicial 
consideration, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled against <marriage> for LGBTQ couples.
45
	
 Although too young to understand the details, I remember the Hawaiian gay 
<marriage> controversy well, but not in terms of my identity.  You see, Baehr v. Lewin 
was so controversial that the ruling emerged in popular culture.  I remember watching A 
Very Brady Sequel with my family in the living room and laughing when Shelley Long, 
the actress playing the Brady mom Carol, insinuates through a communication 
misunderstanding that she is romantically involved with another woman (several 
actually).  The Hawaiian car rental agent involved in the scene states with a wide grin that 
they are open to that here.  It was an interesting moment that poked fun at the Hawaiian 
Supreme Court ruling, and I remember thinking: “huh?” 
 Homosexuality in these cases became inextricably linked to identity under the law 
and a potential reasoning behind the identity politics of LGBTQ national organizations, 
media, and queer theory (Warner, 1999a; Hames-García, 2010). David Grindstaff (2006) 
explains that these rhetorical usages and legal definitions of homosexuality tied the term 
to identity to claim homosexuality as a “suspect class” under the fourteenth amendment 
(p. 70). This means an LGBTQ interlocutor must claim an immutable or essential 
homosexual identity in order to demand equal protection under the law (Grindstaff, 2006, 
p. 70). Therefore, the law is responsible for locking LGBTQ politics into framings of 
identity and morality that have set the political battlefields for the movement for over two 
decades and that have contributed to the normalization of queer culture.
 Nonetheless, Baehr v. Lewin leaves open the possibility for <marriage> for same-
sex couples because the Hawaii Constitution specifically guarantees “sex” as equally 
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protected under the law.  Although the Hawaii Supreme Court rejected <marriage> as a 
right to privacy, the court found that refusing LGBTQ couples <marriage> licenses 
discriminated on the basis of sex (Baehr v. Lewin, 1993, p. 57-60).  This court case 
verified that the couples were denied <marriage> licenses based solely on their same-sex 
status, and the court rejected many of the previous circuit court’s conclusions about 
homosexuality under the law (Baehr v. Lewin, 1993, p. 53-54).  Additionally, in Baehr v. 
Miike, Judge Kevin Chang ruled that there was no rational or compelling reason for 
excluding LGBTQ couples from <marriage>.  In fact, experts from both plaintiff and 
defendant agreed that “same-sex couples are just as qualified to be parents as 
heterosexual couples” (Sant’Ambrogio & Law, 2011, p. 13), and Chang further asserted 
that “if same-sex marriage is allowed, the children being raised by gay or lesbian parents 
and same-sex couple may be assisted,” or <marriage> will help protect these children not 
harm them.  However, rather than let Hawaii become the first state to allow <marriage> 
for LGBTQ couples, Chang placed a stay on his ruling while the state appealed the ruling 
to a higher court (Oshiro, 1996).
	
 Baehr v. Levin and Baehr v. Miike offer synchronic moments in time to utilize for 
an ideographic analysis of <marriage>.  For example, as the beginning of the LGBTQ 
movement for <marriage> rights, this analysis of public texts demonstrates the power of 
<marriage> law in society; these two court cases caused a national and international 
frenzy that leaked into popular culture.  At the same time, this restrictive moment in the 
archive mobilized bodies who wished to ban <marriage> for LGBTQ couples in the state 
constitution.  This conservative coalition elected Republican Linda Lingle as governor in 
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2002 until December 2010, which effectively halted <marriage> for LGBTQ couples in 
the state of Hawaii (Sant’Ambrogio & Law, 2011, p. 14).  It was not until February 23, 
2011, after the 2010 election of Democratic Governor Neil Abercrombie, that Hawaii 
authorized civil unions1 beginning on January 1st, 2012 (Sant’Ambrogio & Law, 2011, p. 
15-16).
<Marriage> as a Dissolution
! In September of 1996, Congress and President Bill Clinton, feeling public 
pressure from other states and territories in reaction to Baehr v. Lewin, enacted the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).  In Congress, the House approved the bill 342 - 67, 
and the Senate approved the bill 85 - 14 (Alliance Defense Fund, 2008).  Clinton signed 
the legislation because same-sex <marriage> was quickly becoming a wedge issue in the 
upcoming 1996 presidential election due to enduring <family values> rhetoric; President 
Clinton had already suffered political damage from enacting “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the 
anti-gay military compromise meant to address the issue of gays and lesbians in the 
military (Sant’Ambrogio & Law, 2011, p. 18).  DOMA principally enacted a federal 
definition of <marriage> for the government: "the word 'marriage' means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife" (H.R. Bill 3396, 1996).  
Additionally, the act gave states the legal right to not recognize the <marriage> of 
LGBTQ couples performed in other states (H.R. Bill 3396, 1996).  Although the eventual 
end of the Baehr v. Lewin saga came in 1999, it was too late to undo the damage of 
DOMA. A firestorm of anti-gay statutes from the legislative and executive branches of 
both federal and state governments began in reaction to Baehr v. Lewin.
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 State legislative and executive-level statutes, or Mini-DOMAs, were enacted to 
regulate the definition of <marriage>.  Thirty-three states created thirty-three different 
versions of DOMA legislation that faced thirty-three judicial actions and rulings on 
<marriage> for LGBTQ individuals. For example, Utah integrated their anti-gay 
<marriage> laws into two existing <marriage> statutes. One listed prohibited or void 
marriages, such as underaged couplings, couples with one undivorced member, and 
“between persons of the same sex” (Utah Code Ann. §30-1-2). The other statute 
established a “marriage recognition policy” that discusses <marriage> three times in 
terms of between a man and a woman and only this type marriage will be “recognize[d], 
enforce[d], or give[n] legal effect” (Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.1). <Marriage> in Utah is 
defined as for heterosexuals only, and LGBTQ couples are regulated alongside children 
and negligent <marriage> partners. 
 In 1996, Arizona passed a Mini-DOMA within incest laws. Arizona like Utah 
addressed <marriage> in two existing <marriage> statutes: (1) Void and prohibited 
<marriages>, such as between “parents and children, including grandparents and 
grandchildren of every degree, between brothers and sisters of the one-half as well as the 
whole blood,” between first cousins over 65 and under 65 with judge approval that one of 
the bodies reproduce, and “marriage between persons of the same sex is void and 
prohibited” (Ariz. Revised Stat. § 25-101).  <Marriage> for LGBTQ couples is marked as 
deviancy that needs to be regulated alongside laws that address incest.  (2) the validity 
and effect of <marriage> in other states that conflict with the above definition are void 
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and prohibited <marriages> (Ariz. Revised Stat. § 25-112), or <Marriage> is for 
heterosexuals only. 
 Following a similar two-part statute organization, Idaho, in 1996, first establishes 
<marriage> as a personal relationship out of a civil contract between a man and a woman, 
and even further, “consent alone will not constitute marriage;” a license issued by the 
state is the only valid <marriage> (Idaho Stat. § 32-201).  By seizing <marriage> as valid 
solely in the archive, Idaho confine <marriage> into a legal status only, but it is a cultural 
practice as well.  In other words, <Marriage> is not only just for heterosexual couplings, 
but any observation of <marriage> in the repertoire is invalid.  For instance, church 
sanctioned ceremonies, commitment ceremonies, and/or any consensual agreement 
between adults is not <marriage> because it has not been archived by the state.  This 
definition of <marriage> in the Idaho law effects both heterosexual couples and LGBTQ 
couples. It was a power grab by the state to be the single bestower of <marriage>.   
Interestingly, Idaho’s other statute utilized same-sex as a performative ideograph 
indicating a degree of masculine agency in the defining of <marriage> in this Idaho 
statute.  It is in this language that LGBTQ <marriages> from other states were prohibited 
(Idaho Code § 32-209). 
	
 The immense and divisive reaction to Baehr v. Lewin is a narrative with fifty 
different histories each of which held different outcomes for LGBTQ couples due to the 
fifty state jurisdictions that all attempted to define <marriage>.  These series of legal 
statutes separated the power of the LGBTQ movement into fifty weaker sub-divisions all 
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engaged in resisting <marriage> in fifty differently complex geo-socio-political state 
judicial systems.  The result was that <marriage> fractured into fifty different legal 
definitions.  Michael Warner (1999b) recounts that: “states are codifying restrictions on 
marriage that had merely been tacit custom before, making new obstacles to marriage 
reform for the future.  Powerful antigay forces have been mobilized around the issue.  If 
reform of marriage was the goal, the tactics of legal advocacy have not worked, and in 
some ways have made the problem worse” (p. 86).  
 Although these are only a few examples of Mini-DOMA legislation, they 
demonstrate a variety of definitions for <marriage> in one moment in history.  For 
example, Colorado in 2000 revised a <marriage> statute to amend it as only between one 
man and one woman (perhaps a hint towards polygamy), as only valid if it fits this 
definition, and as not effecting “common law marriage between one man and one 
woman” (Colo. Revised Stat. Ann. § 14-2-104).  This type of legislation mirrors the 
federal DOMA legislation, but at an individual state level, these Mini-DOMAs are not the 
same.  In other words, as my body and your body travel from geographic location to 
geographic location, our relationship to our chosen partner changes and mutates 
depending on the definition of <marriage> established by these mini-DOMA legislations 
in the archive.  What are the ramifications of this type of <marriage> dissolution?
! As Mini-DOMAs proliferatered, my parents were dissolving their <marriage>, 
selling and dividing their assets, and breaking apart mi familia.  From 1996 to 2001, my 
parents fought between each other, using lawyers and their children, to reach a divorce 
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settlement.  In the process, mi familia lost our home.  My mother, younger sister, and 
younger brother moved to Fresno leaving my father, my other younger brother and 
myself in San José.  Broken and without a home, mi familia has never been the same.  
Family members and my parents’ mutual friends were forced to choose sides.  Others 
were used as spies stoking distrust and anger at people.  Like the dividing of <marriage> 
across fifty states, mi familia was in ruins.  How do you move forward after so much pain 
and hate?  Gloria Anzaldúa advises:
the intellect needs the guts and adrenaline that horrific suffering and anger, evoked 
by some of the pieces, catapult us into.  Only when all the charged feelings are 
unearthed can we get down to “the work.” la tarea, nuestro trabajo--changing 
culture and all its oppressive interlocking machinations.  These pieces are not only 
about survival strategies, they are survival strategies --maps, blueprints, guidebooks 
that we need to exchange in order to feel sane, in order to make sense of our lives. 
(Keating, 2009, p. 127-128)
 In revisiting that horrific suffering and anger, I begin to lose myself to the 
fragments of charged feelings that I have unearthed.  “Mom, are you crying in there? 
Why is the door locked?” I don’t want to get down to the work.  “Who are you talking 
to?!”  Because the memory of my parents’ dissolution of <marriage> is sometimes too 
painful.  I cannot write tears into text even when they are falling on the keyboard as I 
write.  “Brother, we have to pack everything and go to grandma and grandpa’s house. 
Now!”  Yes, my life is a cliché.  My dad cheated on my mom too many times, and the last 
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time with her closest friend was one time too far.  “Where are you going?  Back home? 
We just drove three hours to get here and now your driving back alone!  What are you 
going to do?”  When your spend summer with your mom in jail, abandoned by your 
father, and consoling your younger siblings, you can do nothing but the task (la tarea) in 
front of you.  Our work (nuestro trabajo) must be to change the culture of <marriage> and 
all its oppressive interlocking systems.
  These pieces of <marriage> are survival strategies.  Maps and blueprints that 
show what is wrong with <marriage>.  My dad was too controlling for a free-spirited and 
fearless mother.  His attempts to rehabilitate the <marriage> were too little too late.  “You 
want to have a family game night every week? Like in the commercial?” These 
guidebooks kept my siblings and I away from drugs and the dope game that caught up 
other members of mi familia, but to make sense of our lives, we turned to our aunts and 
uncles for support.  For example, after a year or two of kicking my father out and then 
letting him return, my mother moved on and began to date. “You met a new guy?  How 
exciting!  So...he is coming to meet us and cook us dinner tonight.”  We were happy 
because we were ready to move on too, but (“He’s still here?  It’s been a week”) we 
didn’t know what we had gotten ourselves into (“It’s him or me! You have to choose!”). 
Before we knew it, (“I accept your apology, but why does he have to stay with us?”) we 
lost control of our home to a man that would later become our stepfather. 
  “Robert, when we leave for the weekend, I mean it--no parties.”  Did you think I 
wasn’t your son?  I don’t let anything stand in my way either.  So what?  I threw a party 
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in my house with friends that supported me while you and dad dissolved your 
<marriage>.  You didn’t have to kick me out!  “Robert, maybe after your graduation, you 
should start looking for a place to live.”  You thought I’d cave again!  Ha!  I wanted you 
to feel empty when you saw all my things gone the next day.  I wanted you to cry like 
you made me cry.  I was your own flesh and blood and I felt betrayed.  I promised myself 
that I would never be married like either of you.  <Marriage> was too big for either of 
you to handle.  “Brother, where are you?”  But I didn’t mean to ruin your lives too.  I’m 
sorry I left you alone--no, I’m sorry I abandoned you.  Sister and little brother, I never got 
to watch you grow up from the room next door.  We know firsthand how the dissolution 
of <marriage> has ramifications beyond what can be seen. 
 <Marriage> as a privileged and political relationship affects the entire familia.  Its 
dissolution forced my aunt to let me sleep on her couch on the day of my high school 
graduation.  In archived photographs, I am smiling with my familia, but in the repertoire, 
I moved into a small studio apartment with my other aunt.  Or, how about when my other 
aunt had to pay for my community college books because the dissolution of <marriage> 
sapped and divided my parents’ financial resources?  Maybe, I should be thanking these 
women instead?  Moving between the archive and repertoire of the dissolution of 
<marriage>, there are fissures and cracks that display a dispersal of power and a 
weakening of agency.  How do we move on from so much pain and hate?
hesitation—
before the release
54
of fear
of me
of you
dropping endlessly freewheeling on axis
coin-flipping earth and sky
between we felt—
me/you
y
 I saw you before we met.  While the law2 was debating the (im)possibilities of 
gay <marriage>, we were at Splash, the gay bar near the corner of Post St. and Market St. 
in downtown San José, and I had just drove your current boyfriend (my ex-boyfriend) to 
meet you.  My ex-boyfriend was a co-worker that had made the workplace shitty for  
several months after we broke up, so I was happy to drive him because a happy ex-
boyfriend meant a happy workplace.  I didn’t mean to dance with you alone, and I didn’t 
mean to get with you days after you broke up with him, but could you blame me?
 I still remember hanging out with you in front of the bar with the streetlights 
reflecting playfully on your “stunna shades.”  Our ex-boyfriend was inside (too drunk as 
usual), and we were waiting for him out under the starlight.  I liked how you laughed at 
all my jokes.  I liked your smile and subsequently both dimples.  I’ve always had an 
attraction to thick eyebrows and Latin men.  Later in life, you told me that I was way 
more into you than you were into me.  Is that why you won’t take your glasses off?  I 
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want to see your eyes--too late.  Our ex-boyfriend stumbles out, and we say goodbye.  
Did I just miss my chance?
 But you found me.  Both of us were living in the closet.  My closet was in a 
fraternity house across the street from San José State University, and yours was in your 
parents’ home.  In the corner of the room while my fraternity brothers watched television, 
we re-met online.  You remembered me.  I remembered you.  We decided to meet and go 
to Splash together--we hesitated.  Instead, we sat in your Jeep Liberty two blocks away 
on the corner of Post St. and San Pedro St. talking and laughing.  Before the release of 
fear sent me dropping endlessly freewheeling on axis, we felt something of me and of 
you touch.  For me, it was something I saw in your beautiful hazel green eyes.  
Something missing from me that when you shared it sent me coin-flipping earth and sky. 
Is that how it was for you?  Why?
The world 
is spinning 
The politics 
of the moment 
are blurring. 
Minute by minute in the big scheme of things. 
Yet. 
I have you. 
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This is our time. 
How many lives 
have we searched for each other? 
How many frames 
have we broken? 
I'll always find you.
<Marriage> as an Civil Right
! In response to Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Massachusetts 
ruling that enabled <marriage> for LGBTQ couples, newly re-elected President George 
W. Bush declared in his State of the Union address that "the nation must 'defend the 
sanctity of <marriage>'" (emphasis added, Coontz, 2008, p. 25).  Republicans in 
Congress proposed a federal <marriage> amendment months before the 2004 election. 
At this time, Republicans controlled both houses of Congress, and this federal 
amendment to the Constitution would have expressly defined <marriage> as only 
between a man and a woman.  “In July 2004, a 48-50 procedural vote thwarted 
Republican hopes to bring the proposed amendment before the Senate”  (Sant’Ambrogio 
& Law, 2011, p. 26-27).  “The House waited until September 30th to bring the 
amendment to the floor; it attained a 227-186 majority, but fell short of the 
constitutionally required two-thirds vote”  (Sant’Ambrogio & Law, 2011, p. 27).  This 
failure on the part of the federal government to pass a <marriage> amendment launched 
new legislation by  states to adopt state constitutional amendments to (re)define 
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<marriage> in heteronormative terms.  Subsequently, between 1998 to 2008, thirty states 
adopted constitutional amendments. 
 In that same year, San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom directed the city to start 
issuing <marriage> licenses to gay and lesbian couples (Coontz, 2008, p. 25).  One city, 
one person in that place they call the Bay defied a nation and a U.S. president—3,200 
LGBTQ couples were married in the largest populated state in the nation.  “During March 
2004, local officials also issued <marriage> licenses to same-sex couples in Multnomah 
County, Oregon; Asbury Park, New Jersey; Sandoval County, New Mexico; and New 
Paltz, New York”  (Sant’Ambrogio & Law, 2011, p. 25).  This act of resistance by a local 
government was quickly blocked by the judicial branches of government.
	
 In Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, the court was ruling on whether or 
not an official “exceeds his or her authority when, without any court having determined 
that the statute is unconstitutional, the official deliberately declines to enforce the statute 
because he or she determines or is of the opinion that the statute is unconstitutional”  (95 
P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004)).  In other words, what if officials do not enforce the archive in the 
repertoire?  In an over 110 page decision, the court ruling describes in intimate details the 
movements of the city  and county of San Francisco to make same-sex <marriage> a 
reality.  The court rejected that this ruling was a referendum on LGBTQ rights and 
focused on the maintaining the separation of powers inherent to the state constitution. 
The California Supreme Court ruled against the City  & County of San Francisco and 
invalidated the <marriage> licenses issued.
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 Given that Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco explicitly  avoided the 
question of the constitutionality of Proposition 22, six different court appeals were 
consolidated under the court case In re Marriage Cases to address the issue of LGBTQ 
<marriage> directly. “The question we must address is whether, under these 
circumstances, the failure to designate the official relationship of same-sex couples as 
marriage violates the California Constitution” (183 P.3d 384).  Given that California 
allowed LGBTQ couples to enter into the status of domestic partnerships with many of 
the same benefits as <marriage> but without the actual label of <marriage>, the court was 
aware it  was ruling on the definition of <marriage> but maintained that its ruling was 
based solely on the question of its constitutionality.  The California Supreme Court  ruled 
that allowing LGBTQ couples to enter into only  domestic partnerships impinges on their 
state right to marry and the state’s equal protection clause.  By limiting LGBTQ 
relationship  status to domestic partnerships, the state is limiting the respect and dignity of 
LGBTQ relationships. So, on May  15th, 2008, I received the best birthday gift ever, and 
on July 1st, 2008, I entered into a civil <marriage> with my partner.
How do I say this kindly?
    I make you.
    you don't make me.
    I am. You are. We become.
    Together we are not perfect, hardly
    We do create, and wield
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    wondrous words and—
    and—
     let me show you instead
     Can you follow and not lead? 
	
 We practiced our “kiss” a few days before our wedding ceremony.  Internalized 
forms of a shame manifested during our public/private performances of male lip joining. 
He insisted on making the “kiss” brief, so his familia would not feel uncomfortable; I 
resisted.  I wanted some tongue.  He wanted to maintain his masculinity or machismo to 
avoid the painful labels of puto, maricon, o passivo.  Those names opened old wounds for 
me too.  Regretfully, we succumbed to just a “peck” at our own wedding.  Pero hoy, vivo 
sin vergüenza!  What would you have done?  There is a juncture between the norms, 
values, and needs of my culture and my yearnings for one life instead of two separate 
public and private identities.  “Junctures signal urgencies, needs, crises, and yearnings for 
connection, growth, and new joinings; these critical intercultural junctures are no 
different” (Halualani, Mendoza, and Drzewiecka, 2009, p. 32).
	
 I want our kiss to be sensual.  I want you to feel comfortable placing your tongue 
in my mouth, letting the saliva exchange, without shame.  I made the mistake of settling 
for a peck before, and I will not allow either of us to hold back again.  A politics of 
relation comes from a space of nepantla.  In public, I argue for a change in strategy; 
however, in private, I acknowledge that our community is successfully resisting 
assimilation, because we are breaking apart dominant cultural conceptions and placing 
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them back together in forms that fit our brown, queer bodies in our everyday repertoires, 
texts, and identity negotiations.  I want you close.  Feel my heart racing?  Smell the space 
between us shrinking?  This is it.  They are all watching, leaning into our scandalous 
moment of joining, waiting to be queered.  Will we kiss or just peck?  From a place 
“between,” I wait, eyes closed, lips parted, for you to decide your role in this 
performance.  I encourage you to let your scars open, to confront your inner and outer 
layers of shame, and enter nepantla with me.
<Marriage> as a Wedding 
! The verb chingar is an often employed gendered term to describe/oppress male 
Latino homosexuality and leads to hurtful slanders to identity, such as puto, maricon, y 
joto.  “A multifaceted word,” chingar is a verb “whose primary definition is similar to 
‘fuck’ or ‘fuck over’” and “signifies violent penetration, rape, power that takes advantage 
of weakness in others” (Irwin, 2000, p. 354).  A chingón, notice the masculine form, 
“retains or even reinforces his masculinity;” while a chingada/o, is the “fucker and the 
fucked, in an allegory of the Spanish conquest of Mexico” (Irwin, 2000, p. 354-355). 
This linguistic example shows how Latino men construct a social hierarchy that 
figuratively reflects homosexual assumptions surrounding effeminacy.  This hierarchy is 
enforced through other linguistic codes such a puto (bitch), maricon (faggot), and joto 
(queer) (Carrillo, 1999, p. 237).  The gendered construction of these terms affect the 
experiences of Latinos and Latino gay culture.  My wedding that brought together two 
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familias was always afraid of these terms, yet gay sex is what brought us together for a 
wedding in the first place.
 My husband and I became engaged after a night of great sex, and although this is 
not the most romantic engagement story, this is our story.  We never exchanged rings 
until the day of our wedding; in fact, we were scrambling at the last minute for rings 
because we had forgot.  A queer Chicano position is burdened with two conflicting and 
gendered assumptions about Latino homosexuality.  The first assumption is in line with 
the American definition of homosexuality as “men, whether masculine or effeminate, 
who desire other men, whether masculine or effeminate are regarded as 
homosexuals” (Irwin, 2000, p. 365).  Queer scholars have developed research to unpack 
this assumption of homosexuality and the problematics of this assumption (Grindstaff, 
2003; Rodríguez, 2006).  However, the second assumption is a gendered understanding of 
Latino homosexuality as “male effeminacy and, by implication, as passivity during anal 
intercourse,” or in other words, queer Latino subjects “who want to play ‘the woman’s 
role’ in sex, who desire to be penetrated by other men, are homosexuals, while men who 
penetrate other men remain men, untainted by homosexuality” (Irwin, 2000, p. 365; 
Nezvig, 2001).  These conflicting assumptions implicate issues of machismo and 
demonstrate how a queer Chicano position differs from a queer white position because of 
deep gendered roles enforced linguistically and by masculine agency.
 The ramifications of this gendered separation of Latino homosexuality are wide 
and various.  For example, in a study done of two hundred and ninety four Latino gay 
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men in New York City, it was found that perceptions of masculinity in a partner 
determined the sexual role performed.  “When the partner is perceived as more macho, 
more aggressive, taller, endowed with a bigger penis, darker, more handsome, more 
respondents report they are more likely to take the receptive role in oral and anal sex.  
Conversely, when the partner is perceived as more effeminate, less aggressive, shorter, 
with a smaller penis, lighter skin colour, or less handsome, more respondents are more 
likely to take the inserter role in oral and anal sex” (Carballo-Diégues, Dolezal, Nieves, 
Díaz, Decena, & Balan, 2004, p. 163).  These cultural burdens weighed heavily on our 
minds as we planned our wedding to be very traditional in style.
 For example, my partner and I had a money dance.  The money dance is a typical 
scenario within a wedding that asks guests to pin money onto whomever he/she decides 
to dance with for a few moments.  We included this scenario because, as a working-class 
couple, we had spent all of our money on this wedding, and it is traditional within both of 
our familias to help out the wedding couple financially through this dance ritual.  In the 
repertoire, these moments with the couple are very intimate, and often, it is the only 
chance for guests to disclose messages of support and love.  Men and women danced 
with us for money like many other weddings, but these scenes are queer because these 
messages to us were often political.  When my cousin told me that she was “proud of 
me,” it was because my gay lifestyle made this wedding more than just the merging of 
two familias.  It was a public act of defiance to the heterosexual structure of <marriage> 
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and society, and even though my partner and I were just dancing to our love songs, our 
guests knew the ramifications of their participation. 
 These public and private acts of defiance are a culturally-inflected because we 
were resisting Latina/o notions of machismo.  Machismo places homosexuality into a 
gender binary of activo and not homosexual, or passivo and homosexual and effeminate. 
In constructions of la familia, despite Chicana feminist and queer Chicano interventions, 
machismo continues to inscribe strict and oppressive gender roles on women and attempts 
to alienate queer bodies from an important cultural loci.  Machismo lowers the status of 
women beneath that of men, and when machismo is performed in queer Latino spaces, it 
equates the status of anal sex receivers, or passivos, to effeminate positions that are 
therefore lower than those who are penetrators, or activos.  For example, a man who 
receives oral sex from another man is not viewed as homosexual in some Latino spaces. 
The influence of machismo produces many oppressive linguistic terms that apply 
oppressive gender cultural codes onto queer male bodies; however, what happens to 
machismo as it is enacted in a male-only coupling?  Richard T. Rodríguez (2006), a queer 
Latino scholar, utilized a performative approach to join critiques of machismo by 
postulating that gay male rearticulations of Chicano masculinity contest these variegated 
gendered formations.  We resisted these forces tactically.
 Although we both wore white tuxedos and performed our wedding in traditional 
scenarios to make the queering of our familias a smooth transformation, we did resist 
<marriage>.  For example, my partner and I had equal numbers of bridesmaids and 
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groomsmen for both of us, and each supportive member of our bridal party walked solo 
rather than in couples.  Although we had our nephew and goddaughter as our respective 
ring bearer and flower-girl, they were not separated into separate rooms prior to our 
wedding ceremony because my partner and I got ready together with the entire wedding 
party in the same room.  Additionally, the politics of the moment leaked into the speeches 
of our best man (“He’s found the right Juan!”) and maid-of-honor (“I wasn’t sure what to 
say until I saw you smiling ear-to-ear during the ceremony”).  Is that “normal” for 
<marriage>? However, the most powerful moment for me was when my dad spoke (“I’m 
proud to call you both my sons”) because my partner’s dad had refused to attend our 
wedding.  My mom was so proud (“I love you honey!”), yet my husband, brothers, sister 
and I still took separate pictures with each of my parents.  Are these wedding scenes 
enough to show how we resisted your ideas of <marriage>? 
 When we woke up in the morning, we were not in the same bed.  Our familias 
were too happy for us to get away from our own wedding sober.  I found two of my 
closest friends asleep on the floor beside my bed, and my husband’s co-worker was 
passed out on the other side.  I rub my temples counter-clockwise as I tried to remember 
the last moments of my wedding night.  I remember all our tias (aunts) and tios (uncles) 
helping us clean up the hall, I remember my husband crying in the parking lot because he 
had wanted his dad to be at his wedding, and I remember bits and pieces of the after-party  
at my hotel’s pool and jacuzzi.  I hear my husband moaning from the bathroom--that is 
where he is!?  This wedding that marked the beginning of my <marriage> in the 
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repertoire is mine.  It isn’t perfect for you, but it is perfect for me.  With a 150 guests at 
our wedding that consisted of familia and friends, did we resist <marriage>?
<Marriage> as Activism
 “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California” (Ca. Const. art. I, § 7.5) is the exact language of Proposition 8 or the 
California Marriage Protection Act.  Proposition 8 amended the California Constitution to 
restrict and control the bodies of California citizens into specific couplings of gender and 
sexuality.  Essentially, this constitutional amendment stripped California’s LGBTQ 
community of the right to marry their partners.  The law is a notoriously common 
ideology used by the state apparatus to restrict and control subjects within its jurisdiction. 
However, I am a body directly affected by this law.  My partner and I were married on 
July 1st, 2008 in San José at the Santa Clara County Courthouse.  Locating my body in 
this law carries a burden to answer the question: why me?
 Proposition 8 was a constitutional amendment that bypassed the normal democratic 
process and was presented to the public for a vote by a special interest.  Instead of 
receiving a thorough vetting by elected representatives and the governor, Proposition 8 
needed a simple majority to be enacted into law.  In fact, Proposition 8 successfully 
passed, because 7,001,084 bodies voted to restrict and control the rights of LGBTQ 
citizens. On the opposing side, 6,401,482 bodies voted to protect the rights of LGBTQ 
citizens (Bowen, 2008b).  The Latino community made up “18%” of the votes in the case 
of Proposition 8, and it passed within the Chicana/o community by a margin of “53%” 
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Yes votes to “47%” No votes (CNN, 2008).  Without the direct initiative process, it is 
unlikely that the California Marriage Protection Act would have become law, and “in 
2008 approximately $83 million was spent on Proposition 8” (Van Vechten, 2010, p. 
25-26). 
 Why me?  Throughout the direct initiative process, I was a newlywed trying to 
integrate the new roles of “husband,” “son-in-law,” and “brother-in-law” into my identity. 
I was finding my place in a new family, and I was making room for my husband in mine. 
Laws that are enacted through the direct initiative process no longer represent the interest 
of the people.  These initiatives are fueled by special interests that use their immense 
funds to highjack the system.  Elected representatives like Jerry Brown and Debra Bowen 
have little control over the process.  Organizations in support of Proposition 8 could not 
have passed this discriminatory constitutional amendment through the normal legislative 
channels, so protectmarriage.com hired Andrew Pugno to craft the language that would 
eventually lead to my forced divorce.  Although the California Supreme Court eventually 
ruled to protect my <marriage>, Proposition 8 forever changed the same-sex <marriage> 
debate.
 Researching archival records placed emotional harm to my body.  I found 
information from proponents of this law that spewed lies about my body.  For example, 
Ron Prentice, Rosemarie Avila, and Bishop George McKinney in the California General 
Election Tuesday, November 4th, 2008 Official Voters Information Guide (Bowen, 
2008a) wrote an argument for Proposition 8 that stated: “Proposition 8 DOES NOT take 
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away any of those rights and does not interfere with gays living the lifestyle they 
choose” (p. 56).  However, I chose my husband.  I paid nearly 10,000 dollars on a 
traditional ritual that would join our families.  I had plans to start a family and have 
children with my husband, yet Prentice, Avila, and McKinney have the nerve to argue 
that Proposition 8 “protects our children from being taught in public schools that ‘same- 
sex marriage’ is the same as traditional marriage” (p. 56).  This law affects my body 
directly and the future bodies I plan to bring into the world.  Will my kids be safe in 
school?  How is this not an interference?  Grappling with these emotional topics was 
directly a result from this law’s attempt to restrain and control me.  I cannot be a coffee 
shop activist who only talks about social justice and does not place his/her body on the 
line for social change.  If you were me, would you?
 Standing with my sign, shouting with my community, and fighting for my 
<marriage>, we are lined up on one-side of the street.  In my private photos of 
proposition 8 protests, my little (at the time) middle-school brother’s sign “My Bro is 
Gay and its OK” smiles up at me beside my father’s body and my friends’ bodies. The 
signs of “No on 8 Separate is not Equal” and “Straight but NOT NARROW equality 4 
all” join with “RESTABLECE la IGUALDAD de MATRIMONIO” to remind us all that 
our coalition extends beyond language, gender, race, and sexual orientation.  Insulted by 
an anti-gay sign, we crossed the street (not to fight) but to envelope the lone protester.  
We were inspired when a lesbian couple with their son refused to let the man stand alone 
on the other side of the street with his hateful sign.  We lined both sides of Santa Clara 
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street united yet divided in a tight multicolored fabric of anger, love, and sorrow.  Will 
you join us in public?  Or, will you privately curse my <Chicano>, <homosexual> 
<marriage> as an immoral to your <family values> around your kitchen table too?
!  I am afraid that you may not understand the stakes.  I fear you will read my 
words, rip out my heart, and shit all over my life experiences.  However, this is the price 
of identity work.  I am an activist, but this is because my body is being restricted by the 
law in ways that I must resist.  I am not a deviant; I stuff, lick, write, stamp, and send my 
wedding invitations just like you.  My kisses may be more controversial, but I didn’t 
make them this way--you did.  My writing is not solely a presentation of my object of 
study, rationale for methodology, and statement of purpose; my writing represents me.  It 
is the art of a raced (Chicano), queer body operating in a political system that wants me 
invisible.  It wants me to “peck” you on the cheek and go back to my working-class 
neighborhood with the rest of the body class.  It wants me to leave my race and sexuality 
at the door and squeeze into frames that were not made for my voice.  Well, I say, break 
all the frames!  When I write, I rip off my scabs and let the my wounds breath fresh air to 
heal.  It is the Coyolxauqui imperative.  It is an on-going process not a product.
 This analysis is not over.  The struggle continues across the country and the world. 
What about Question 1 in Maine?  This referendum asked Maine residents to take away 
<marriage> rights won through the democratic process (i.e., state legislature voted and 
state governor approved), and by utilizing a similar strategy as in Proposition 8, this 
referendum was successful.  What about New York? Although <marriage> rights were 
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won through the democratic process, there are now conservative groups mobilized to 
rescind these rights as well.  In New Hamphire, <marriage> for LGBTQ couples is on the 
2012 election ballot, and in Washington, a heartfelt press conference by a new ally, 
Governor Christine Gregoire, has ignited anti-gay fundraising.  <Marriage> for LGBTQ 
couples, at the time of this thesis, is at a grand total of six territories out of fifty, but as 
activists, we cannot just move to the next state because we have to spend time, energy, 
and treasure defending battlegrounds already won with considerable costs already. 
Additionally, there is federal legislation moving through the U.S. Senate called the 
Respect of Marriage Act (R.O.M.A.) that would set a new federal definition of 
<marriage>.  Is this where we should place our hopes?  I am searching for a way to end 
this study without ending it.  I want you to see the story continuing for me and other 
LGBTQ couples like me.  Our struggle doesn’t end just because this text ends.  We are 
still struggling in the repertoire.  Can you see us fighting?  Crying?  What are you going 
to do to help?  How will you (re)define <marriage>?
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Chapter Five: <Marriage> as Metaphors in the Tradition of the Shaman
	
 Rather than attempt to definitively explain what <marriage> should be, this thesis 
utilizes what Anzaldúa calls a shaman aesthetic to offer new conceptions of <marriage> 
to cure the “paralyzing states of confusion, depression, anxiety, and powerlessness” 
within the LGBTQ and Chicano civil rights movements, so “we are catapulted into 
enabling states of confidence and inner strength” (Keating, 2009, p. 122).  A reparative 
theory may appear weak in comparison to a stronger theory that aims to establish broad 
claims.  However, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (2002) explains that strong theory is 
problematic because the force has a powerful reductive range and can make tautological 
thinking hard to identify, even as it makes it compelling and near inevitable; the result is 
that both writers and readers misrecognize whether and where real conceptual work is 
getting done, and precisely what that work might be (p. 136).  For example, in 
<marriage> as a heternormative process, Michael Warner’s (1999) article “Normal and 
Normaller: Beyond Gay Marriage” and in his book The Trouble with Normal: Sex, 
Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life are reviewed to construct a vision of <marriage> as 
a public policy unworthy of LGBTQ politics.  His work on normalization and shame 
continues to be the pre-eminent point of entry and burden to all queer scholars engaging 
in <marriage> studies. 
 However, a “reparative impulse, on the other hand, is additive and accretive.  Its 
fear, a realistic one, is that the culture surrounding it is inadequate or inimical to its 
nurture; it wants to assemble and confer plenitude on an object that will then have 
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resources to offer to an inchoate self” (Sedgwick, 2002, p. 147).  In other words, a theory 
that seeks to repair engages <marriage> from multiple perspectives to offer resistance for 
multiple selves.  For example, in <marriage> as raced, I offer a nepantla lens to interrupt 
Warner’s top-down and Grindstaff’s bottom-up constructions of <marriage> to open up 
the institution as an intersectional hegemonic power structure.  This move is meant to 
move beyond the framings of identity and morality that have locked LGBTQ politics 
from contextual battlefield to battlefield with the Christian Right.  It is from the spaces 
between and betwixt that this thesis enters the conversation on <marriage>. However, in 
order to observe <marriage> as an intersectional hegemonic power structure, I needed a 
method capable of moving beyond text and into the realm of bodies.
 This project focused on merging an ideographic analysis with autohistoria to 
construct a critique of <marriage> that shows both the possibilities for resistance to 
heteronormativity and the shortcomings of current <marriage> equality campaigns.  An 
ideographic analysis of my <marriage> placed the archive and repertoire into 
juxtaposition to offer moments of resistance where Warner (1999b) sees none.  For 
instance, in <marriage> as an autohistoria,  I explain how autobiographical performance 
and performative writing blend genres of writing in text that are typically kept separate 
by western notions of knowledge.  Autohistoria is a technique created by queer Chicana 
feminists that operates as a live political document to offer resistance through “theories in 
the flesh.”  These enfleshed theories are “where the physical realities of our lives--our 
skin color, the land or concrete we grew up on, our sexual longing--all fuse to create a 
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politic born out of necessity” (Anzaldúa and Moraga in Calafell, 2007, p. 7) and are 
capable of pushing back on the status quo stories that are often privileged over all others.  
By extending Grindstaff’s (2003) work on a performative conception of ideographs, this 
thesis tracked <marriage> using Diana Taylor’s (2003) conception of an archive and the 
repertoire in the law and everyday life. This method breaks up (like Coyolxauhqui) 
Warner’s critique of <marriage> because it allows a rhetor to analyze a constellation of 
chronological (i.e., diachronic) and in the moment (i.e., synchronic) definitional clashes, 
congruencies, and paradoxes to highlight agency.  Ideographs have the potential to break 
up binary thinking and therefore open up possibilities for resistance.
 Throughout this thesis, I engaged mestizaje by utilizing metaphors in the tradition 
of the shaman. Mestizaje is a termed utilized by queer Chicana feminists to theorize on/
from/with ambiguity (Anzaldúa, 1987; Keating, 2009; Calafell, 2007).  Although I stop 
short of declaring myself a shaman, “I do” want to engage <marriage> utilizing the 
queerness of the shaman to empower this dialogue.  “In non-literate societies, the shaman 
and the poet were the same person. The role of the shaman is, as it was then, to preserve 
and create cultural or group identity by mediating between the cultural heritage of the 
past and the present everyday situations people find themselves in” (Keating, 2009, p. 
121).  As a mestizo (mixed-blood), my body has a biological connection to many races. 
For example, my chest and face do not grow hair like many of the indigenous bodies of 
Latin America.  However, I am part African-American on my father’s side and part 
English and Dutch on my mother’s side (both sides carry the brownness of the Mexican 
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nation).  <Chicano> as an identity allows me to be all and/or none of these mixed 
histories without judgment.  It is a position capable of utilizing ambiguity as a political 
position and a mode of queer resistance to structures of power.
 Gloria Anzaldúa describes this queer perspective as a “shaman aesthetic.” A 
shaman aesthetic charges a poet-shaman with the career of identifying “illness” or 
“sickness” in a culture or a body in terms of “disinformation/misinformation” in the form 
of metaphors.  For example, “all Mexicans are lazy and shiftless is an example of a 
metaphor that resists change.  This metaphor has endured as fact even though we all 
know it is a lie.  It will endure until we replace it with a new metaphor, one that we 
believe in both consciously and unconsciously” (Keating, 2009, p. 122).  By blending 
writing genres and utilizing rapid switching of voice and audience, I created a 
performative aesthetic on the page that is meant to invoke the queerness of the shaman. 
The responsibility of the poet-shaman is to “cure” the disease by removing the old dead 
metaphors (dis-indoctrination) or adding what is lacking, such as restoring balance and/or 
strengthening the physical, mental, emotional states of a person (Keating, 2009, p. 122).  
As a writer, I have the ability to heal my culture(s) through this methodology.  For 
instance in my autohistoria, I utilized the metaphors for <marriage> as LGBTQ politics 
and as a civil right to underscore how powerful the link between <marriage> and the 
LGBTQ community has become.  By offering <marriage> as an autohistoria, my goal is 
not to convince you of one definition rather than another, but to present metaphors like 
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the shaman that allow you (the reader) to locate yourself within the complex hegemonic 
structure of <marriage>.
 This emphasis on our interconnectedness encourages an analysis where readers 
explore how they identify, cross-identify, and/or disidentify with <marriage>; the act of 
disidentification is a mode of queer resistance.  For instance, in <marriage> as a wedding, 
I move between common scenarios of wedding alongside the public and private 
repertoires of my own <marriage> to show how my partner and I navigated the scenes of 
our wedding.  Thus, autohistoria utilizes the writer-text-reader relationship to bring the 
reader into a nepantla state, so she/he can explore her/his identity with the writer to move 
from fragmentation to wholeness and leave nepantla with a new identity and 
subsequently new repertoires to engage themselves, their communities, and the world.  
“If we’ve done our job well we may give others access to a language and images with 
which they can articulate/express pain, confusion, joy, and other experiences thus far 
experienced only on an inarticulated emotional level” (Keating, 2009, p. 122).
 Those (like myself) in a state-sanctioned <marriage> now have the room to resist 
these systems because <marriage> is an ideograph not an ideology.  This method escapes 
the trap of identity politics, because it utilizes nepantla to engage <marriage> as raced. 
The goal of an autohistoria is to highlight our differences yet never lose sight of our 
unbreakable connections to each other; this is a coalitional politics that encourages active 
participation with the document.  For example, my history with <marriage> has injured 
me, divided my community, and fractured my nation and my world.  In <marriage> as a 
dissolution, I track <marriage> at the national and state level through DOMA and Mini-
75
DOMA legislation that effectively weakened the LGBTQ movement by dispersing the 
legislative and judicial power to define <marriage> across all fifty states. This dispersal 
mirrored my own parents’ <marriage> dissolution, which weakened the power of mi 
familia and therefore our combined ability to resist dominant power structures.  Don’t 
you (the reader) have an investment in this painful dissolution?  Aren’t you also a part of 
this imbalance and indoctrination?
	
 As a queer Chicano feminist, I draw epistemological strength from queer Chicana 
feminist literature.  For example, rather than position this work in a politics of identity or 
morality, I choose to frame this work in what Aimee Carrillo Rowe, a Chicana feminist 
lesbian operating in communication studies, terms a “politics of relation.” Carrillo Rowe 
(2009) extends work by Gloria Anzaldúa to define a politics of relation as a politics that 
“calls us to hold ourselves accountable for the power we have, points us toward an 
accounting of the often overlooked exploitative sources of that power, and compels us to 
think about our interrelationship with the earth and all other beings” (p. 25).  In other 
words, I am a coalitional subject marked by my location (e.g., framings of <marriage> 
created/maintained prior to my coming into this location) yet constituted through the 
relations in which I belong (e.g., my conception of <marriage> was constructed by the 
subjects in which I interact with). 
	
 <Marriage> can be conceptualized as a politics of relation.  It is capable of 
destroying any bridge to an Other and yet can create bridges that can never be broken. 
Even in divorce, <marriage> continues to hold us within the political, cultural, and social 
apparatus.  It effects future generations and contains ideological constructions of 
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<marriage> passed down from past generations (in the archive and the repertoire).  “The 
point is to become mindful of the political alignments to which we are committing 
ourselves, often without our awareness, even as we remain grounded in and accountable 
to those growing-up places, those ancestral lines which we cannot just set down because 
we carry them on our backs” (Carrillo Rowe, 2009, p. 26).  Identity, thus, is not simply 
external but also internal, and to participate in a politics of relation means being mindful 
of both as well as the tension/relation between the two; the act of mindfulness and 
reflexivity involves both morality and identity politics.  An autohistoria, by presenting 
itself as a piece of Art, participates politically and in the creation of an autohistoria, the 
writer/artist uses their body/emotions to access the spirit to present a work that attempts 
to bring the reader into the space (in)between--nepantla.
	
 Ideographs can be utilized as a reparative theory to heal wounds because they 
disperse the power of an ideology.  Instead of drawing a hard line in the sand or creating 
strong theory that seeks to replace one ideology with another, an ideographic analysis 
utilizing autohistoria (in the tradition of the shaman) applies multiple metaphors to an 
ideology.  Some overtly display the power of the structure (such as in <marriage> as 
activism), others display covert resistances (such as in <marriage> as an archive and 
repertoire), and still more connect to aspects of the human condition obscured by theory, 
tradition, and entrenched power interests.  In this thesis, instead of getting back into old 
and dated arguments about pro or con, morality or identity, I encourage you to pick a 
metaphor and dialogue with those you share a relation with then pick another and delve 
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deeply into its contents then pick another and apply still more metaphors to it.  As a 
politics of relation there are multiple ways to build bridges to <marriage> but only if you 
are willing to engage <marriage> as an intersectional hegemonic power structure.
	
 It is my greatest hope that this thesis not speak for you but speaks to you.  A 
theme of Chicana feminist literature is that a Chicana feminist does not seek approval, 
acceptance, or intellectual legitimacy from exterior sources (Davalos, 2008, p. 155).  A 
Chicana feminist writes “sin vergüenza/without shame,” and she “employ[s] a bold 
language and stance that does not anticipate or reproduce social codes and norms. 
Chicana feminist thought waits for no one” (Davalos, 2008, p. 155-156).  It is risky to 
strip down your body and bare your soul to a reader.  For instance, this document will 
exist in the archive for any who are street-wise or privileged enough in the repertoire to 
access it. As long as this university stands on this patch of floodplain beside this 
Guadalupe River that empties into this San Francisco bay, you will find me here waiting. 
Knowing that I wrote this without shame is essential to understanding my performance 
choices and my tone of writing.  
 For instance, this work is not an autoethnography but an autohistoria, and an 
important take away from this work is that an autohistorian must acknowledge their 
privileges.  It is not enough to narrate your stories or tell your truth, but you must 
critically evaluate the ways in which you operate structurally and culturally within the 
world.  In my case, I am male and able-bodied, and these privileges have allowed me to 
write this autohistoria in this particular way in this particular time and space.  If an 
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autohistorian is not evaluating her or his privileges, then the work is an autoethnography 
with a history of oppression that falls into the trap of western forms of knowledge.  To do 
the work of autohistoria, a rhetor must embody her/his emotions and access the body to 
build coalitional connections to others.  It is about telling a cultural history of oppression 
and resistance through a particular context and/or subjectivity and not about telling a 
story simply for the sake of telling a story.  This is different from autoethnography 
because it is a relational politic not a politic of individuality.
 As a relational politic, autohistoria asks a rhetor to embody their emotions and 
experiences sin vergüenza.  In this autohistoria, I have shared personal and private 
moments that may put my body at risk, but I do so to immerse you (the reader) in a 
different world not to exclude you but to invite you into a space that you have always 
already been a part of.  Although I am afraid of my future (who knows what will happen 
to my body), I cannot shy away from telling my truth because I do so to connect us 
together in this struggle for social justice.  An autohistorian analyzes and writes to show 
our shared culture and our shared responsibilities, and with my history, I show our 
commonalities both negative and positive.  Emotions, spirituality, secrets, and unasked 
for yet given privileges are ways in which we can connect on the page. 
 Finally, the pages of my autohistoria did not begin in chapter four but from the 
moment you read my dedications.  Metaphors in the tradition of the shaman have been 
deployed in my throughout this document to help tweeze apart <marriage> yet make it 
more complex to better reflect the human spirit behind this powerful intersectional 
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hegemonic power structure.  It is not that following western ways of organizing a thesis 
are lacking in knowledge, but it is about privileging a different type of knowledge that 
often gets subjugated to the margins.  By utilizing Chicana feminist literature, critical 
race theory, queer theory, and whiteness studies, this work is trying to create an affective 
response within the reader and break out of the constraints that have stalled dialogue 
surrounding this powerful structural-cultural phenomenon known as <marriage>.  I could 
not have done it without you, and I encourage the reader to not let this document die.  
Engage the metaphors and discover your own self and our shared culture(s) within 
<marriage>.  If you were to take away anything from this document on <marriage>, it is 
this: we are in this together.  Although the study of ideographs uncovers the instability of 
harmful metaphors and their exploitation/agency in the archive and the repertoire, we are 
in need of new metaphors that can enable social change or social justice between and 
betwixt the cracks.  What metaphors can we create together?  How/will we (re)define 
<marriage> for the next generation of humanity?
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Footnotes
89
1 ! In the aftermath of Baehr v. Lewin and DOMA, the Vermont Supreme Court 
issued a courageous decision in Baker v. State reigniting the <marriage> debate at the 
turn of the century. In Baker v. State, three same-sex couples in committed relationships 
ranging from 4 to 25 years (e.g., two couples had even raised children together) “applied 
for a marriage license from their respective town clerk, and each was refused a license as 
ineligible under the applicable state marriage laws" (744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999)). In this 
court case, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the state constitution required that same-
sex couples be afforded equal benefits and protections" (Strasser, 2002, p. x) and 
instructed the Vermont legislature to fix this inequity. However, instead of permitting 
"same-sex couples to marry, it decided...to create a separate status for same-sex 
couples," (Strasser, 2002, p. xi) or civil unions.
2  	
 In 2004, Massachusetts became the first state in the union to issue <marriage> 
licenses to LGBTQ couples. In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, same-sex 
couples attempting to secure <marriage> licenses were denied, so the couples filed action  
claiming that this policy and practice violated numerous provisions of the state 
constitution. The Massachusetts Supreme Court agreed: “The question before us is 
whether, consistent with the Massachusetts Constitution, the Commonwealth may deny 
the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of 
the same sex who wish to marry. We conclude that it may not” (798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 
2003). Additionally, the court did not leave open the possibility of adopting civil unions 
like in Vermont. “The Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all 
individuals. It forbids the creation of second-class citizens” (798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 
2003)). Subsequently, Massachusetts became the first state in the nation to (re)define 
<marriage> for LGBTQ couples. This ruling came out on November 18th, 2003 right in 
the middle of the 2004 Presidential Election season. <Marriage> for LGBTQ couples 
became a wedge-issue that divided the country.
